PHIL
310: Epistemology LARKIN:
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
A.
The
following four claims are individually plausible but jointly incompatible:
1.
For
all beliefs x: if x is justified/warranted, then there is some belief y on
which x is based and y is also justified/warranted.
2.
There
are some beliefs that are justified/warranted.
3.
The
basing relation is irreflexive—no belief can provide adequate epistemic support
for itself.
4.
The
basing relation is transitive—if a is based on b and b is based on c, then a is
based on c.
5.
There
can be no infinite chain of justification for any belief.
B.
Statements
1-4 imply that there is an infinite chain of beliefs justifying some belief x.
1.
Given
2, some belief x is justified.
2.
According
1, it follows that x is based on some belief y and y is justified. This rules out the possibility that a chain
of justification terminates.
3.
According
to 3, y must be different from x. This
rules out a tight circle of justification—a belief justifying itself.
4.
Claim
4, in combination with 3, rules out a wider circle of justification.
5.
So
1-4 together imply that there is some belief justified by a chain of beliefs
that neither terminates or goes around in a circle.
C.
Two
Interpretations
1.
Structural
Interpretation: Regress of belief states threatened by someone asking, “How (in
what way) do you know P?” where it is presumed that you do in fact know. This interpretation goes naturally with
claiming that there is a psychological/cognitive impossibility of an infinite
chain of beliefs.
2.
Dialectical
Interpretation: Regress of justification threatened by someone who continually
asks, “How do you know that?” as part of a skeptical attack. This interpretation goes naturally with the
impossibility of an infinite chain giving rise to or generating justification.
3.
The
structural problem is really an empirical one, and thus best left for the
cognitive scientists/neuro-physiologists.
Epistemologists should just be primarily concerned with the dialectical
problem.
D.
Responses
to Regress Problem
1.
Reject
(5): Infinitist—claims that there can
be an infinite chain of beliefs that justifies some belief x.
2.
Reject
(2): Skeptic—claims that there are no
justified/warranted beliefs.
3.
Reject
(3): Internalist Foundationalist—see
below
4.
Reject
(1): Externalist Foundationalist—see below
5.
Reject
(4): Coherentist—see below
A.
Basis
Claim: There are basic beliefs. The
chain of justification can terminate in these basic beliefs.
B.
Internalist
Foundationalism
1.
Basic
beliefs are self-supporting—they are their own basis.
2.
Basic
beliefs are justified in virtue of having some intrinsic property (that S can
be aware of on the basis of reflection alone).
3.
Traditional
examples of such properties
a.
Necessity:
It is not possible for P to be false.
b.
Infallibility:
It is not possible for S to believe P and P be false.
c.
Indubitability: It is not possible for S to believe P while
there are rational grounds for doubting P.
d.
Incorrigibility: It is not possible for S to believe P and
for us to appreciate that there are rational grounds for doubting P.
4.
Problem:
Not many beliefs have these special properties—the limited number of ones that
do seems to provide an insufficient basis for knowledge of the external world.
C.
Externalist
Foundationalism
1.
Basic
beliefs are not self-supporting in any evidential sense—they are not based on
any other belief.
2.
Basic
beliefs are justified in virtue of their source.
3.
Traditional
sources for basic beliefs:
a.
Reason
b.
Introspection
c.
Memory
d.
Perception
4. Problem:
What about these sources confers warrant on basic beliefs? It does not seem that every belief produced
by such sources are warranted, so which of the beliefs produced by which of
these sources is warranted?
(Reliabilism can be seen as attempting to answer these questions.)
A.
Basic
idea: A belief B is justified/warranted if it coheres with some system of
beliefs.
B.
A
belief B is coherent with set S iff (??):
1.
B
is consistent with S.
2.
B
is the best available explanation fo the truth of all beliefs in S.
3.
S
allows one to meet some range of skeptical challenges to B.
C.
Weak
vs. Strong
1.
Weak:
Coherence is one of the determinants of justification, among others.
2.
Strong: Coherence is the sole determinant of
justification.
D.
Positive
vs. Negative
1.
Positive:
Coherence is sufficient for justification.
2.
Negative:
Coherence is necessary for justification.
E.
Four
Versions of Coherentism
1.
Strong
Positive: Coherence by itself is sufficient for justification.
2.
Strong
Negative: Lack of coherence is sufficient for lack of justification.
3.
Weak
Positive: Coherence can enhance justification.
4.
Weak
Negative: Lack of coherence can erode justification.
F.
Problems
1.
Weak
versions fairly trivial and do not explain anything about what makes a belief
warranted/justified.
2.
Strong
versions seem subject to counter-examples—Being subjectively
rational/irrational with respect to some beliefs does not entail that those
beliefs are more likely to be true/false.
It seems that a belief’s being rational is not sufficient for it to be
warranted, and a belief’s being irrational is not sufficient for it to lack
warrant.