The Argument from Evil

The argument has two versions, the logical (the existence of evil is inconsistent with that of God; that is, if one obtains the other is impossible) and the evidential one (the existence of evil makes that of God not impossible but unlikely). Here we look at the evidential version.

• The argument deals with two aspects of divine evil: evil permitted by God, and evil directly performed by God.
• God is assumed omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent as in the Abrahamic religions.
• 'Evil' here refers not only to what may be called 'moral evil,' such as the effects of wars, crimes, vices etc., but also to what may be called 'natural evil,' such as the effects of natural calamities like earthquakes, disease, hurricanes, etc.

The ‘God permitting evil’ version

1.God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent.
2. Evil exists
3. An omnibenevolent being would eliminate evil, if possible.
4. An omniscient being would know all about evil and how to eliminate it, if possible.
5. An omnipotent being can do anything which is possible.
6. Likely, it is possible to eliminate at least some of the existing evil.
7. Hence, (1) is likely false.

Note that:

• Some theists argue that evil exists because of our bad deeds: God gave us free will by making us in his image, and we misused it by choosing to sin. But this won't easily work. Freedom of choice involves at most the capacity to do either X (the good deed) and not-X (the evil deed). But having the capacity do the evil deed doesn't entail that one does the evil deed. God could have made us all saints, with the capacity to sin but with the always successful tendency to struggle against it. The problem can be encapsulated in a rhetorical question: why are we not all as good a St. Francis and as smart as Newton?
• In addition, many animals have very unpleasant death, and what do they have to do with our sins? Worse, they cannot sin, according to most theological views.

‘God as the direct source of evil’ version

Some versions of the problem of evil address evil directly caused by god or done under his direct command. Here it is necessary to appeal to some specific revelation. As before, god is assumed perfect. But perhaps the assumption of goodness, or even decency, would suffice. Here are a few variations.

• The god of scripture often engages in grossly immoral behavior. For example, He
1. orders the wholesale slaughter of children and pregnant women (Hosea 13:16)
2. slaughters people for ludicrous reasons: 20,000 Jews because some of them had sex with Baal-worshippers (Num. 25:1-9); 70,000 Jews because Saul, on God’s orders, has taken a census of his men (2 Sam. 24: 1, 10, 15)
3. orders repeated genocide, e.g., Caananites, Hittites, Hivites, Perizzites, Girgashites, Amorites, Jebusites (Josh. 1-12).
4. allows the beating of slaves to death as long as they survive for two days (Ex. 20:20-21)
5. orders the killing of children who strike their parents (Ex 21:15), witches (Ex 22:18), Sabbath breakers (Ex 31:14-15), idolaters, including friends and family (Deut. 13: 6-10, 12-16; 17:2-7), homosexuals (Lev. 20:13), rebellious or disobedient sons (Deut. 21:18-21), adulterers (Deut. 22:22), miscellaneous stonings, including that of women who are not virgins when they marry (Deut. 22:13-21)

Since an omnibenevolent god would not behave this way, the god of scripture does not exist.

• The god of Abrahamic religions punishes people eternally, which is evil (unjust) because there’s no proportion between any sin and an infinitely long torment. Even if the torment were finite, fitting the crime, why didn’t god show himself before, thus making the sin less likely? So, god does not exist.
• God is hidden in the sense that he does not reveal himself to all of those who honestly seek him, or do not resist him out of wickedness, thus preventing them from having a loving relationship with him. Since such relationship is the highest good we can achieve, god does not love many of us. (Think about how a loving parent would behave). So, god does not exist.

It’s important to distinguish between:

1. P providing evidence for Q

2. P being compatible with Q.

In (1) the truth of P makes that of Q certain or at least likely; in (2) P and Q can both be true, without the need of one making the other more likely. In fact, P may be compatible with Q even if the truth of P makes the falsity of Q likely. So, even if one finds the evidential argument from evil strong, one may have even stronger reasons for believing in god, in which case one should try to show how (2) applies in the case, that is, come up with a story reconciling god’s existence and the (merely apparent?) existence of evil. Of course, many theists have produced just such stories, which typically do not address the issue of animal suffering, which we do not consider here.