PHIL 309: Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy LARKIN: Fall 2003

Semantic Puzzle	Russell	Frege	Meinong
Law of Identity -The law of identity implies that the substitution of co-referential terms should preserve truth value -Scott =the author of Waverly -“George IV wondered whether Scott is the author of Waverly” is true. -But “George IV wondered whether Scott is Scott” is false.	There is no failure of substitution because we do not derive the one sentence from the other by a simple substitution of terms—‘the author of Waverly’ is not a referring term.	There is no failure of substitution because the relevant terms are not co-referential in such an indirect context. Neither ‘Scott’ nor ‘the author of Waverly’ refers in this context to the man Sir Walter Scott—instead they refer to their customary senses, which are different.	?????????? Perhaps Meinong could dig in his heels and say that actually George IV was wondering whether Scott was Scott. Or perhaps Meinong could say that “Scott” and “the author of Waverly” actually pick different existent objects (which happen to overlap in the actual world).
Law of Excluded Middle -The law of excluded middle implies that either “The present king of France is bald” is true or “The present king of France is not bald” is true. -But if we make a list of all bald things and all things that are not bald, the present king of France is not on either list.	The relevant reading of “The present king of France is not bald”— i.e, ‘It is not the case that there is a unique present king of France that is bald’—is in fact true.	Frege could say that “The present king of France is not bald” is true because the subject term actually refers to the null set, and it is true that the null set is not bald.	??????????? Perhaps Meinong would simply deny the law of excluded middle and say that the existent object referred to by “present king of France” is both bald and not bald, though in different possible worlds.
True Negative Existentials -Some negative existential claims like “The round square does not exist” are true. -Either the subject term, ‘the round square’ refers or not. -If it does, then the claim is false and so it is not true. -If it does not, then the claim is meaningless and so it is not true.	Because empty phrases like “the round square” are not really referential terms, it does not follow from the fact that there is no referent that the sentence is meaningless.	Again Frege would want to say that referring expressions like ‘the round square’ actually do refer to the null set, or have the null set as their extension. And it is true to say about the members of the null set that they do not exist.	Meinong would say that there simply are no true negative existential claims, though there can be true negative subsistence claims.
Informative Identity Claims -Some true identity claims are informative, like “Hesperus is Phosphorous”. -But if it is true, then it means the same as “Hesperus is Hesperus”. -“Hesperus is Hesperus” is trivial and not informative.	At least one term of any true informative identity claims is actually a definite description that is not really a referring term. A true informative identity claim of the form ‘a = the F’ will not have the same meaning as ‘a = a’.	True informative identity claims are in part about the senses of the terms involved and not just their referents. So if ‘a’ and ‘b’ have different senses, then ‘a = b’ can be informative and have a different meaning from ‘a = a’.	?????????? Perhaps Meinong would say that there are no true informative identity claims. Or perhaps he would say that terms like ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ pick out different existent objects that overlap in the actual world.