PHIL
309: Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy
LARKIN:
Spring 2003
________________________________________
A.
The
role of “esse is percipi” in Idealist arguments
1.
Moore
contends that this claim is essential to any Idealist argument
2.
By
disputing the Idealist support for this claim, he will have thus refuted an
argument for the Idealist thesis that reality is spiritual.
3.
Moore
is not arguing that the Idealist thesis that reality is spiritual is false.
4.
He
is arguing only that arguments for it based on the claim that to be is to be
perceived are flawed.
5.
For
he contends that arguing for the claim in the way Idealists must leads to
contradiction.
6.
So
Moore does not refute the Idealist thesis but the Idealist argument for that
thesis. And he does so by showing not
that the claim ‘esse is percipi’ is false, but by showing that the Idealist way
of arguing for that claim leads to contradiction.
B.
“Percipi”:
This is interpreted in the most general sense to include not only sensations
but thoughts.
1.
sensations:
mental events with non-conceptualized, qualitative content (e.g., pains,
sensations of red)
2.
thoughts:
mental events with conceptualized, propositional content (e.g., my belief that
the Orioles won the ’83 World Series)
C.
Some
useful distinctions
1.
Metaphysical
a.
A
claim S is necessary iff S is true in all (of a certain range of)
possible worlds.
b.
A
claim S is contingent iff S is true in some (of a certain range
of) possible world but false in some other possible world (in that range).
2.
Kinds
of Necessity
a.
Logical: True in all logically possible worlds—i.e., worlds that abide the
laws of logic. (e.g., P º ~~P)
b.
Metaphysical: True in all metaphysically possible worlds—i.e., worlds that abide
the laws of metaphysics. (e.g., water =
H2O)
c.
Physical (Nomological): True in all physically possible worlds—i.e., worlds
that abide the laws of nature. (e.g., E
= mc2 )
3.
Epistemological
a.
A Priori: Capable of being known independently of sense-experience (or at least
no more sense experience than is required to attain the relevant concepts)
b.
A Posteriori: Not capable of being known independently of sense-experience.
4.
Semantic
a.
Analytic: True solely in virtue of the meanings of the words/concepts involved.
b.
Synthetic: Not true solely in virtue of the meanings of the words/concepts
involved.
D.
Three
senses of “esse is percipi”
1.
Synonymy:
a.
The
words ‘esse’ and ‘percipi’ have precisely the same meaning.
b.
Analogous
to “Bachelors are unmarried adult human males”.
c.
Under
this interpretation the claim is certainly false.
2.
Analytic
Containment:
a.
The
meaning of ‘percipi’ is part but not all of the meaning of ‘esse’.
b.
Analogous
to “Bachelors are male”.
c.
Under
this interpretation, the claim is as trivial as claiming that B
follows from (A and B).
3.
Synthetic
Necessity:
a.
The
only way for ‘esse is percipi’ to be both true and significant is if it is a
synthetic necessity.
b.
Synthetic:
A claim about the world/the nature of reality, not merely about the way we use
words or concepts.
c.
Necessity:
A claim whose negation is in a sense ‘inconceivable’. (I take it that we are talking about a metaphysical necessity
here. In which case the claim would be
saying that in a ll metaphysically possible worlds, wherever you have the
property of being you have the property of being perceived.)
E.
Moore’s
Overall Argument Against Idealism
P1: Idealism
is committed to the central claim that “Esse is percipi”.
P2: The
Idealists are committed to their central claim being a synthetic necessity.
2a: “Esse is percipi” can be interpreted in one
of three ways:
(i)
Analytic
Identity: ‘esse’ =df ‘percipi’
(ii)
Analytic
Necessity: NEC(‘esse’ Édf ‘percipi’)
(iii)
Synthetic
Necessity: NEC(esse É percipi) [ & ~(esse
=percipi)]
2b: The
analytic identity statement is false.
2c: The
analytic necessity claim is unimportant.
2d: The Idealists
intend their central claim to be a claim about the world, not merely a claim
about the meanings of words or the relationships between concepts.
2e: So the
central claim must be interpreted as a synthetic necessity.
[Moorean Assumption #1: 2a fails to consider the possibility of a Synthetic Identity:
esse = percipi, analogous to water = H2O.]
P3: Idealists
are committed to saying that ‘esse is percipi’ can be proved by the law of
non-contradiction alone.
3a: The
central claim is not a posteriori. (AS
rationalists, the absolute idealists are committed to their central claim about
the fundamental nature of reality to be knowable not through the senses but
through Reason.)
3b: So the
central claim must be knowable a priori either as a self-evident truth or as
one that can be proved by the law of non-contradiction alone.
3c: As a
matter of fact the Idealists do not claim that it is self-evident. But at any rate it does not appear to be
self-evident—and self-evidence, by definition, ought to be a transparent
feature (i.e., if some proposition has that feature, then it is obvious that it
does).
3d: So the
central claim must be provable by the law of non-contradiction alone—which I
take to mean provable by Reductio Ad Absurdum without importing any premise
that is not a tautology (truth of logic).
[Moorean Assumption #2: That there is no alternative for the rationalist to self-evident
or logically demonstrable. Assumes
that Reason is not, in part, a non-demonstrative but penetrating faculty—one
that can provide direct access to truths that are not self-evident.]
P4: Proving
the central claim of idealism by the law of non-contradiction alone requires
the assumption that, e.g., yellow (Y) = sensation of yellow (S).
4a: Such a
demonstration of the central claim of idealism requires going from ~NEC(Y É S) to POS(Y & ~Y) [or POS(S &
~S)].
4b: But such
a move assumes that Y = S.
C1: So
Idealism is committed to the claim that ~(Y = S) from P2 and to the claim that
(Y = S) from P3 and P4.
C2: So
Idealism leads to contradiction.
F.
Simplified Version of Argument Against Idealism?:
Idealists =df Rationalists who argue that reality is
spiritual on the basis of the claim that to be is to be perceived.
P1: Idealists
are committed to saying that a synthetic necessity can be proved by the law of
non-contradiction alone.
P2: The claim
that a synthetic necessity can be proved by the law of non-contradiction alone
leads to contradiction.
C: So
Idealism leads to contradiction.
G.
Idealism
vs. Realism in a Nutshell
1.
Pro-Idealist
Argument
P1: We
cannot conceive of anything that is inconceivable by us.
P2: Only
conceptions are conceivable.
P3:
Conceptions are mind-dependent.
C1: So , we
cannot conceive of anything that is mind-independent.
C2: So we
can have no grounds for positing the existence of mind-independent entities.
2.
I
believe the crux of the issue between idealists and realists comes down to P2
of the above argument, which I believe is supported by a certain view of thinking/thought.
a.
The
Idealist to support P2 will say that thought cannot reach out to the world
beyond the mind—thought only provides direct access to thoughts/experiences,
i.e., mental events.
b.
The
Realist can respond by saying that this is a flawed model of thought—thought
can reach out into the world and provide direct access to mind-independent
objects.
3.
It
is not clear that there is any non-question-begging way to defend either view
of thought against the other.
4.
Both
the Realist and the Idealist have trouble with the Skeptic:
a.
The
Skeptic claims that (i) it is possible for appearances to diverge from
reality—there can be non-veridical experiences, but (ii) veridical and
non-veridical experiences are indistinguishable.
b.
The
Idealist will have trouble accounting for (i).
c.
The
Realist will have trouble accounting for (ii).