I. MAIN ARGUMENT
P1: The
theory of descriptions (TOD) avoids the difficulties of regarding denoting
phrases as standing for genuine constituents of propositions.
1a: Difficulties
with apparently empty denoting phrases.
1b: Difficulties
with the relationship between meanings and denotations.
P2: TOD
can give solutions to the three semantic puzzles.
2a: The Law of Identity Problem
2b: The Law of Excluded Middle Problem
2c: The
Problem with True Negative Existentials
P3: TOD
helps resolve some important philosophical issues.
3a: Empty and Fictional Names
3b: Frege’s Puzzle
3c: Talking
and thinking about things with which we are not acquainted.
C: TOD
is good.
P1: If
Meinong is right, then the phrase ‘the round square’ denotes an object that
exists but does not subsist.
P2: But
if ‘the round square’ denotes an object that in some sense exists, then there
is in some sense a thing that is both round and not round at the same time.
P3: This violates the law of non-contradiction.
C: So Meinong is wrong.
P0: Assume
that a denoting phrase expresses a meaning and denotes a denotation/referent.
P1: “The
present king of England is bald” is not about the meaning of the phrase ‘the
present king of England’ but rather its denotation.
C1: So,
by parity of form, “The present King of France is bald” is not about the meaning
but the denotation of ‘the present king of France’.
P2: If
“The present king of France is bald” is about the denotation of ‘the present
king of France’, then the sentence is nonsense (it is not about anything).
P3: But
the sentence is not nonsense (it is false [or perhaps it is neither true nor
false]).
C2: So
“The present king of France is bald” is not about the denotation of ‘the
present king of France’.
C3: Since
C1 and C2 are contradictory, the assumption (P0) must be false.
P1: If
denoting phrase sentences have a subject-predicate structure, then they are
(all) meaningful only if the denoting phrase denotes something.
P2: There
are (some) meaningful denoting phrase sentences with empty denoting phrases.
C: So denoting phrase
sentences do not have a subject-predicate structure.
Meinong objects to P2 by claiming that apparently
empty denoting phrases denote objects that exist but do not subsist.
Russell complains that this way around the problem
violates the law of non-contradiction.
Frege objects to P3 by claiming that apparently
empty denoting phrases express senses that denote the null class.
Russell complains that this way around the problem
is ad hoc.
III. Problem with the Relation between Meaning and Denotation
Gray’s Elegy Argument
(version 1)
P0: Assume:
Denoting phrases express denoting complexes which denote denotations.
P1: The
relationship between a denoting complex and the denotation must be a ‘logical
one’.
C1: So
propositions expressed using denoting phrases are solely about the denotation
(they are not about the denoting complex).
P2: “Scott is the author of Waverly”
is not solely about the denotation of the denoting phrase ‘the author of Waverly’ but also about the meaning of
that phrase (i.e., the denoting complex).
C2: So
propositions expressed using denoting phrases are not solely about the
denotation (they are also about the denoting complex).
C3: Since
C1 and C2 are contradictory the assumption must be false.
Gray’s Elegy Argument
(version 2)
P1: If
denoting phrase (DP) sentences have a subject-predicate structure, then a DP
must either contribute an object (its denotation) or a denoting complex (its
meaning) to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which DP occurs.
P2: If
DP contributes an object, then the proposition expressed is solely about the
denotation and not the denoting complex.
P3: If
DP contributes a denoting complex, then still the proposition expressed is
solely about the denotation and not the denoting complex.
[Due to the logical relation that must exist between
a denoting complex and the denotation.]
P4: Propositions
expressed by DP sentences are not solely about the denotation but also in part
about the denoting complex.
[Scott/author of Waverly puzzle]
C: So DP sentences do
not have a subject-predicate structure.