Eternity
1. Traditionally, eternity has been understood in two ways:
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Eternity1: sempiternity, i.e., existing at each time.
For example, perhaps energy/mass is eternal in this way.
NOTE: Detensers deny that tomorrow's sea battle or meta-facts about
it (e.g., the fact that tomorrow there will be a sea-battle) are sempiternal.
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Eternity2: eternity proper, i.e., totally independent
of time because a thing eternal in this sense is not in time, doesn't exemplify
temporal items, and doesn't involve temporal items. For example,
Augustine thought of God in this way; probably Plato thought of Forms and
their relations this way.
NOTE: Meta-facts involve temporal items (i.e. facts or events); hence,
they are not eternal2.
To these two traditional notions, one might add a third:
Eternity3: a thing eternal in this sense is not in time,
but it depends on time because it involves temporal items. For example,
meta-facts, including the fact that the whole B-series is the way it is,
are eternal3.
2. Some reasons for holding that God is properly eternal (eternal2):
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if time has a beginning, then God cannot be in time, otherwise God would
have a limited existence.
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if God were in time, then we would not be free because God would foresee
our actions.
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if God were in time, then God could, at least in principle, change.
3. Boethius: “eternity is possession all at once of unlimited life”.
Hard to make out what Boethius had in mind.
4. Possible accounts of eternity:
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First definition: Eternity as a non-temporal, non-successive, partless
duration. Hence:
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God not in time
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no succession in God (divine simplicity)
Problem: how can duration be non-successive?
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all worldly events simultaneously present to God
Problem: since simultaneity transitive, some world-events both
simultaneous and non-simultaneous.
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Second definition: Eternity as tenseless successive duration,
while time is tensed. Hence:
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no past, present and future for God. In this sense God’s life “all
at once”.
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succession in divine duration.
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non-simultaneous parts in divine duration
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God not in time, because time is tensed
Problem: Dates apply to God; but some dates simultaneous with,
say, past events. Hence tenses apply to God.
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Third definition: Eternity as a present (tensed) instant
outsidet ime (nunc stans), while time is tensed. Hence:
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no successive parts in eternity because instants are partless.
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eternity unlimited because no instant before or after
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eternity is a permanent present, nunc stans (tensed)
Problem: “remaining present” entails presence through some instants.
So, how can an instant have any permanence?
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Fourth definition: Eternity as a tenseless instant outside time
and time is tenseless. Hence:
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no successive parts in eternity
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eternity unlimited because no instant before or after
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eternity not a present instant (nunc stans).
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all moments in tenseless time exist equally for God.
5. Objections to view that God is outside time, and hence has no
temporal relation to the world.
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If God creates X at time t1 and Y at time t2, then
God changes. But if God changes, then God is in time.
Reply: God timelessly creates X at t1 and Y at t2.
Hence, God doesn’t change.
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God has extrinsic denominations. Hence God changes; hence God is
in time.
Reply: extrinsic denominations not real changes.
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If God isn't in time, then God doesn't know what time it is now.
Hence, God is not omniscient, which cannot be.
NOTE: this objection presupposes a tensed view of time.