Freedom, Determinism and Responsibility

Importance of issue of free will for ethics: praise and blame involve responsibility, which involves free will. Example: punishment as retribution presupposes responsibility, and hence free will.

1. Determinism, Simple Indeterminism, and Fatalism

• Deterministic systems: In our everyday lives, we typically deal with things (systems) whose behavior is completely predictable, at least in principle. For example, if my car is in working order (that is, the battery is charged, the wires connected, etc.) and I turn the ignition key, then the car will start. Now, one might say, suppose that it does not start, a common enough experience. Then, I assume that the car was not in working order, that is, that the battery was not charged, and/or the wires not connected, and/or... In other words, I assume (correctly) that if the car is in working order and the ignition key turned (that is, the car is in a certain initial state), then there will be one and only one outcome: it will start. In so doing, I assume that the car is a deterministic system. We can make this more precise.

Suppose that system S is in initial state IC. Then, if there is a set of laws DL ruling the temporal evolution of S that, given IC, always determine the same outcome, S is a deterministic system. In other words, if given IC and DL there is only one possible outcome, then S is a deterministic system. NOTE: If you adopt the view that if A causes B then, given A, B couldn’t but occur, then a deterministic system is one in which every state is caused by the previous one.

Note that

1. In a deterministic system, every state depends on the previous one.

2. There is no mention of matter or of spirit/soul in the definition; don’t fall for the idea that determinism somehow presupposes matter or ‘mechanical’ laws, whatever that means. If you want to say that a spirit/soul, if such a thing exists, is not deterministic you need an argument.

• A simple indeterministic system is one whose temporal evolution includes random jumps. For example, some believe that quantum systems, upon measurement, randomly acquire the values of the properties being measured from among a set of possible values. So, if I were to measure the momentum of a quantum particle in a given physical state P and obtain the value of X, and then measure the momentum of another particle in the very same physical state P, I could obtain (amazingly) a result different from X. As far as we know, macroscopic systems such as the brain, when in contact with other macroscopic systems, do not display random features.
• Fatalism: For Determinism, events depend on and are determined by previous IC and DL. Hence, don't confuse Determinism with Fatalism, which is the view that the past and the present have no effect on the fated future.  Consider the following argument during an impending hurricane: "tonight either I'll die or not.  If I die, then taking precautions is useless.  If I don't die, taking precautions is superfluous.  Hence, taking precautions is useless or superfluous."  This argument, which is formally valid (but is it sound?), embodies Fatalism.  If Fatalism is true, then what you do or don't do has no effect whatsoever on fated events.  Note also that one could hold that Fatalism is true only with respect to certain events, although it's hard to see why only these events should be fated.

There are two basic positions on the issue of free will and Determinsm: Incompatibilism and Compatibilism.

2. Incompatibilism: this is the view that free will and Determinism are incompatible, they cannot coexist. In other words, I cannot be both a determinstic system and have free will.

Here is the standard argument for this view:

1.  Free will entails the ability to do otherwise. (This is the basic intuition behind Incompatibilism).
2.  The ability to do otherwise is incompatible with Determinism because given IC and DL the outcome cannot be otherwise than it is.
3.  Hence, Determinism and free will are incompatible.

Criticism of (1) and (2):

Objection to (1):
"I could have done otherwise" is irrelevant because of cases of over-determination.   For example, I want an apple and so I pick one; however I also have an implant that makes me want apples when I want fruit (that is, I'm over-determined).  Still, since my wish did not come from the implant, one might say that I picked the apple freely.  Nevertheless, I could not have done otherwise because of the implant.

Possible reply: Insist that in cases of over-determination, there is only the illusion of free will. In reality, one has no free will unless one really had the power to do otherwise.

Objection to (2):
"I could have done otherwise" must be understood as elliptic for "I would have done otherwise if I had so chosen," meaning that nobody was forcing me. But this sense of "I could have done otherwise" is compatible with Determinism. (This objection contains the kernel of Compatibilism, of which more later).
Possible reply: if Determinism true, then I could not have willed differently, even if it might be true that if I had willed differently I would have acted differently as nobody was forcing me to do what I did.

3. Incompatibilism splits in two opposite camps: some incompatibilists, the hard determinists, claim that we are deterministic systems and that consequently we do not have free will. Others, the Libertarians or Free Willists, claim that we have free will, and consequently we are not deterministic systems.

Evidence in favor of Determinism:

• When we interact with people, we behave as if they were deterministic systems; for example, we expect them to react in predictable ways. When they do not, we try to find why they did what they did, as in the bank teller example.
• The brain is a complex midsized electrochemical system. Typically, such systems are deterministic.
• Libet's experiment: voluntary movement is preceded by about 6 seconds by brain activity detectable with imaging technology.. Hence an experimenter can tell that the movement will occur about 6 seconds before it actually occurs. However, the earliest time the subject reports forming a conscious intention of moving is about 200 milliseconds before the motion.

NOTES:

• Lack of free will seems to lead to the denial of moral responsibility.  Hence, no retribution is morally justifiable.  Incapacitation, deterrence and amelioration are the only morally justifiable components of punishment left.
• A deterministic system needn't be like a zombie in that it can have flexibility, intelligence, knowledge, and wisdom. Again, don’t fall for the idea that a deterministic system must be some sort of mechanical device.

In short, the Hard Determinist believes that both Incompatibilism and Determinism are true, and therefore concludes that there’s no free will.

Evidence in favor of Free Willism (Libertarianism):

First argument:

1. Introspection shows that my choices are not determined.
2. Introspection is reliable
3. Hence, I have free will

Problem: there's little evidence that introspection is always reliable, as post-hypnotic suggestion shows.  More generally, even assuming that I'm unaware of being determined, it doesn't follow that I'm aware of not being determined.

Second argument:

1. We have a capacity to choose in cases of indifference of equilibrium.
2. But such choices are possible only if they are not determined.
3. Hence, we have free will
   Problems:
• the only evidence we can choose in a state of equilibrium is introspection, which is not reliable.
• even if we can choose in a state of equilibrium, the mechanism of choice may be determined (e.g. a subroutine which is called up when we are stuck).  All the argument shows is that if I am a deterministic system, I'm a rather flexible one.

NOTE: Free willists do not adopt Simple Indeterminism but Agent Causation. My free actions are not uncaused (random, as in quantum mechanics), nor are they caused by my previous mental states. Instead, they are caused by me, the agent. That is, I (the person) cause the changes in the brain eventually resulting in my actions.

Thought Question: What would be wrong in saying that I am a simple indeterministic system, as such a system is defined above?

Problem: What is this mysterious entity, the person, the self, which can cause changes in the brain without being caused itself to do so? Note that it cannot be the sum total of one's mental states. If you believe that your choices are fully determined by your mental states just before you choose, then you’re a determinist!

Thought Question: Would appealing to a soul help? What do we know about souls, if anything?

4. Many philosophers reject both Hard Determinism and Free Willism because they reject Incompatibilism, the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. These are the supporters of Compatibilism or Soft Determinism, who hold that we are both fully determined can have free and will.

Here is an argument for Compatibilism:

1. Free will is acting as one decides, without undue constraints. As long as it is not forced but voluntary, a choice is free.
   NOTE: hence, the real question whether an action or a choice are free is not whether they are caused, but whether they are caused in the right way.
2. Hence Determinism and free will are compatible.
3. We are deterministic systems. (Here plug in some of arguments for this view we looked at above).
4. Hence, we are both fully determined and can have free will. That is, we have free will when our choices are determined in the right way, for example by not being forced.

Criticism of (1): Absence of external impediments or constraints is not enough to guarantee freedom of the will. Voluntariness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for free will; a free choice is not only voluntary but also presupposes that the agent could have chosen otherwise.

NOTE: It's crucial to understand that Compatibilists are as much determinists as Hard Determinists: they don't disagree on whether we are determined (they think we are), but on whether this precludes having freedom of the will.

5 Many philosophers have argued that the type of free will we just considered is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a higher type of freedom of the will. What is required, in addition, is that

· our will, our decisions, be attuned to our values

· these values are obtained in the right way.

So, even if I do have free will but I choose something I really think I should not choose, as it happens in cases of weakness of the will, then I have not attained this higher level of freedom of the will, which is a form of autonomy.

What counts as ‘the right way’ in obtaining one’s values is a subject of discussion, but to the extent that one's values are the result of

· indoctrination

· are accepted without any critical evaluation

one cannot be autonomous. Note that although there is a need for the social transmission of values through parents, school, etc., to the extent that one accepts them uncritically, one cannot achieve autonomy.

Thought Question. We must transmit our values to the next generation. However, we do not want to indoctrinate our children and turn them into people who just parrot what they have been told by their parents, their ministers, or their teachers. So, we need to give them the intellectual tools that allow them to criticize and possibly reject the beliefs we transmitted to them. Have you been given such tools? If not, why not? Is this course providing them to you?

NOTES:

o A particularly interesting issue is that of false consciousness, a traditional Marxist notion, namely, a set of beliefs and/or values which contribute to keep one in a position of unwarranted inferiority. For example, in some societies the woman, the paria, the racially oppressed, may believe (wrongly) that their position is the result of some natural inferiority, not of specific forms of exploitation; similarly, one might believe in forms of individualism that keep one in a subordinate position in society.

o Some social philosophers, H. Marcuse, for example, believe that the consumer society produces a peculiar form of false consciousness by creating ‘false needs’ (the need for expensive clothing, cars, big TV’s etc.). The satisfaction of false needs produces euphoria (but not happiness), requires aggressive and competitive behavior resulting in a sort of rat race, and favors powerful economic and political groups at the expense of the welfare of most people.
Problem: how does one determine what a false need is? Perhaps one can claim that a need which is not based on any rational means of persuasion is a false one.
NOTE: If one accepts the theory of false needs, a liberal consumer society like ours presents the particular problem that its members, suffering from false consciousness, do not want to be emancipated.