David Hume

ONE considerable advantage that arises from Philosophy, consists in the sovereign antidote which it affords to
superstition and false religion. All other remedies against that pestilent distemper are vain, or at least uncertain.
Plain good sense and the practice of the world, which alone serve most purposes of life, are here found
ineffectual: History as well as daily experience furnish instances of men endowed with the {2} strongest capacity
for business and affairs, who have all their lives crouched under slavery to the grossest superstition. Even gaiety
and sweetness of temper, which infuse a balm into every other wound, afford no remedy to so virulent a poison;
as we may particularly observe of the fair sex, who tho' commonly possest of their rich presents of nature, feel
many of their joys blasted by this importunate intruder. But when found Philosophy has once gained possession of
the mind, superstition is effectually excluded, and one may fairly affirm that her triumph over this enemy is more
complete than over most of the vices and imperfections incident to human nature. Love or anger, ambition or
avarice, have their root in the temper and affection, which the soundest reason is scarce ever able fully to correct,
but superstition being founded on false opinion, must immediately vanish when true philosophy has inspired
juster sentiments of superior powers. The contest is here more equal between the distemper and the medicine, {3}
and nothing can hinder the latter from proving effectual but its being false and sophisticated.

    IT will here be superfluous to magnify the merits of Philosophy by displaying the pernicious tendency of that
vice of which it cures the human mind. ([editor's note] 1) The superstitious man says Tully2 is miserable in every
scene, in every incident in life; even sleep itself, which banishes all other cares of unhappy mortals, affords to
him matter of new terror; while he examines his dreams, and finds in those visions of the night prognostications
of future calamities. I may add that tho' death alone can put a full period to his misery, he dares not fly to this
refuge, but still prolongs a miserable existence from a vain fear left he offend his Maker, by using the power,
with which that beneficent being has endowed him. The presents of God and nature are ravished from us by this
{4} cruel enemy, and notwithstanding that one step would remove us from the regions of pain and sorrow, her
menaces still chain us down to a hated being which she herself chiefly contributes to render miserable.

    'TIS observed by such as have been reduced by the calamities of life to the necessity of employing this fatal
remedy, that if the unseasonable care of their friends deprive them of that species of Death which they proposed
to themselves, they seldom venture upon any other, or can summon up so much resolution a second time as to
execute their purpose. So great is our horror of death, that when it presents itself under any form, besides that to
which a man has endeavoured to reconcile his imagination, it acquires new terrors and overcomes his feeble
courage: But when the menaces of superstition are joined to this natural timidity, no wonder it quite deprives men
of all power over their lives, since even many pleasures and enjoyments, {5} to which we are carried by a strong
propensity, are torn from us by this inhuman tyrant. Let us here endeavour to restore men to their native liberty,
by examining all the common arguments against Suicide, and shewing that that action may be free from every
imputation of guilt or blame, according to the sentiments of all the antient philosophers. ([editor's note] 2)

    IF Suicide be criminal, it must be a transgression of our duty either to God, our neighbour, or ourselves. --
To prove that suicide is no transgression of our duty to God, the following considerations may perhaps suffice. In
order to govern the material world, the almighty Creator has established general and immutable laws, by which
all bodies, from the greatest planet to the smallest particle of matter, are maintained in their proper sphere and
function. To govern the animal world, he has endowed all living creatures with bodily and mental powers; with
senses, passions, {6} appetites, memory, and judgement, by which they are impelled or regulated in that course
of life to which they are destined. These two distinct principles of the material and animal world, continually
encroach upon each other, and mutually retard or forward each others operation. The powers of men and of all
other animals are restrained and directed by the nature and qualities of the surrounding bodies, and the
modifications and actions of these bodies are incessantly altered by the operation of all animals. Man is stopt by
rivers in his passage over the surface of the earth; and rivers, when properly directed, lend their force to the
motion of machines, which serve to the use of man. But tho' the provinces of the material and animal powers are
not kept entirely separate, there results from thence no discord or disorder in the creation; on the contrary, from
the mixture, union, and contrast of all the various powers of inanimate bodies and living creatures, arises that
sympathy, harmony, {7} and proportion, which affords the surest argument of supreme wisdom. The providence
of the Deity appears not immediately in any operation, but governs every thing by those general and immutable
laws, which have been established from the beginning of time. All events, in one sense, may be pronounced the
action of the Almighty, they all proceed from those powers with which he has endowed his creatures. A house
which falls by its own weight, is not brought to ruin by his providence, more than one destroyed by the hands of
men; nor are the human faculties less his workmanship, than the laws of motion and gravitation. When the
passions play, when the judgment dictates, when the limbs obey; this is all the operation of God, and upon these
animate principles, as well as upon the inanimate, has he established the government of the universe. Every event
is alike important in the eyes of that infinite being, who takes in at one glance the most distant regions of space,
and {8} remotest periods of time. There is no event, however important to us, which he has exempted from the
general laws that govern the universe, or which he has peculiarly reserved for his own immediate action and
operation. The revolution of states and empires depends upon the smallest caprice or passion of single men; and
the lives of men are shortened or extended by the smallest accident of air or dies, sunshine or tempest. Nature
still continues her progress and operation; and if general laws be ever broke by particular volitions of the Deity,
'tis after a manner which entirely escapes human observation. As on the one hand, the elements and other
inanimate parts of the creation carry on their action without regard to the particular interest and situation of men;
so men are entrusted to their own judgment and discretion in the various shocks of matter, and may employ every
faculty with which they are endowed, in order to provide for their ease, happiness, or {9} preservation. What is
the meaning then of that principle, that a man who tired of life, and hunted by pain and misery, bravely
overcomes all the natural terrors of death, and makes his escape from this cruel scene: that such a man I say, has
incurred the indignation of his Creator by encroaching on the office of divine providence, and disturbing the order
of the universe? Shall we assert that the Almighty has reserved to himself in any peculiar manner the disposal of
the lives of men, and has not submitted that event, in common with others, to the general laws by which the
universe is governed? This is plainly false; the lives of men depend upon the same laws as the lives of all other
animals; and these are subjected to the general laws of matter and motion. The fall of a tower, or the infusion of a
poison, will destroy a man equally with the meanest creature; an inundation sweeps away every thing without
distinction that comes within the reach of its fury. Since therefore the lives of men {10} are for ever dependant
on the general laws of matter and motion, is a man's disposing of his life criminal, because in every case it is
criminal to encroach upon these laws, or disturb their operation? But this seems absurd; all animals are entrusted
to their own prudence and skill for their conduct in the world, and have full authority as far as their power
extends, to alter all the operations of nature. Without the excercise of this authority they could not subsist a
moment; every action, every motion of a man, innovates on the order of some parts of matter, and diverts from
their ordinary course the general laws of motion. Putting together, therefore, these conclusion, we find that
human life depends upon the general laws of matter and motion, and that it is no encroachment on the office of
providence to disturb or alter these general laws: Has not every one, of consequence, the free disposal of his own
life? And may he not lawfully employ that power with which nature has endowed him? In order {11} to destroy
the evidence of this conclusion, we must shew a reason why this particular case is excepted; is it because human
life is of such great importance, that 'tis a presumption for human prudence to dispose of it? But the life of a man
is of no greater importance to the universe than that of an oyster. And were it of ever so great importance, the
order of human nature has actually submitted it to human prudence, and reduced us to a necessity, in every
incident, of determining concerning it. -- Were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the peculiar
province of the Almighty, that it were an encroachment on his right, for men to dispose of their own lives; it
would be equally criminal to act for the preservation of life as for its destruction. If I turn aside a stone which is
falling upon my head, I disturb the course of nature, and I invade the peculiar province of the Almighty, by
lengthening out my life beyond the period which by the general laws of matter and motion he had assigned it.
([editor's note] 3) {12}

    A hair, a fly, an insect is able to destroy this mighty being whose life is of such importance. Is it an
absurdity to suppose that human prudence may lawfully dispose of what depends on such insignificant causes? It
would be no crime in me to divert the Nile or Danube from its course, were I able to effect such purposes.
Where then is the crime of turning a few ounces of blood from their natural channel? -- Do you imagine that I
repine at Providence or curse my creation, because I go out of life, and put a period to a being, which, were it to
continue, would render me miserable? Far be such sentiments from me; I am only convinced of a matter of fact,
which you yourself acknowledge possible, that human life may be unhappy, and that my existence, if further
prolonged, would become ineligible; but I thank Providence, both for the good which I have already enjoyed, and
for the power with which I am endowed of escaping the ill that {13} threatens me.3 To you it belongs to repine at
providence, who foolishly imagine that you have no such power, and who must still prolong a hated life, tho'
loaded with pain and sickness, with shame and poverty -- Do not you teach, that when any ill befals me, tho' by
the malice of my enemies, I ought to be resigned to providence, and that the actions of men are the operations of
the Almighty as much as the actions of inanimate beings? When I fall upon my own sword, therefore, I receive
my death equally from the hands of the Deity as if it had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a fever. The
submission which you require to providence, in every calamity that befals me, excludes not human skill and
industry, if possible by their means I can avoid or escape the calamity: And why may I not employ one remedy as
well as another? -- If my life be not my own, it were criminal for me to put it in danger, as {14} well as to
dispose of it; nor could one man deserve the appellation of hero, whom glory or friendship transports into the
greatest dangers, and another merit the reproach of wretch or misereant who puts a period to his life, from the
same or like motives. -- There is no being, which possesses any power or faculty, that it receives not from its
Creator, nor is there any one, which by ever so irregular an action can encroach upon the plan of his providence,
or disorder the universe. Its operations are his works equally with that chain of events which it invades, and
which ever principle prevails, we may for that very reason conclude it to be most favoured by him. Be it animate,
or inanimate, rational, or irrational, 'tis all a case: its power is still derived from the supreme Creator, and is
alike comprehended in the order of his providence. When the horror of pain prevails over the love of life; when a
voluntary action anticipates the effects of blind causes, 'tis only in consequence of those {15} powers and
principles which he has implanted in his creatures. Divine providence is still inviolate, and placed far beyond the
reach of human injuries. 'Tis impious says the old Roman superstition4 to divert rivers from their course, or
invade the prerogatives of nature. 'Tis impious says the French superstition to inoculate for the small-pox, or
usurp the business of providence by voluntarily producing distempers and maladies. 'Tis impious says the modern
European superstition, to put a period to our own life, and thereby rebel against our Creator; and why not
impious, say I, to build houses, cultivate the ground, or fail upon the ocean? In all these actions we employ our
powers of mind and body, to produce some innovation in the course of nature; and in none of them do we any
more. They are all of them therefore equally innocent, or equally criminal. But you are placed by providence,
like a centinal, in a particular station, {16} and when you desert it without being recalled, you are equally guilty
of rebellion against your almighty sovereign, and have incurred his displeasure. -- I ask, why do you conclude
that providence has placed me in this station? For my part I find that I owe my birth to a long chain of causes, of
which many depended upon voluntary actions of men. But providence guided all these causes, and nothing
happens in the universe without its consent and co-operation. If so, then neither does my death, however
voluntary, happen without its consent; and whenever pain or sorrow so far overcome my patience, as to make me
tired of life, I may conclude that I am recalled from my station in the clearest and most express terms. 'Tis
providence surely that has placed me at this present in this chamber: But may I not leave it when I think proper,
without being liable to the imputation of having deserted my post or station? When I shall be dead, the principles
of {17} which I am composed will still perform their part in the universe, and will be equally useful in the grand
fabrick, as when they composed this individual creature. The difference to the whole will be no greater than
betwixt my being in a chamber and in the open air. The one change is of more importance to me than the other;
but not more so to the universe.

    -- 'TIS a kind of blasphemy to imagine that any created being can disturb the order of the world, or invade
the business of Providence! It supposes, that that being possesses powers and faculties, which it received not
from its creator, and which are not subordinate to his government and authority. A man may disturb society no
doubt, and thereby incur the displeasure of the Almighty: But the government of the world is placed far beyond
his reach and violence. And how does it appear that the Almighty is displeased with those actions that disturb
society? By the principles {18} which he has implanted in human nature, and which inspire us with a sentiment of
remorse if we ourselves have been guilty of such actions, and with that of blame and disapprobation, if we ever
observe them in others: -- Let us now examine, according to the method proposed, whether Suicide be of this kind
of actions, and be a breach of our duty to our neighbour and to society.

    A MAN who retires from life does no harm to society: He only ceases to do good; which, if it is an injury, is
of the lowest kind. -- All our obligations to do good to society seem to imply something reciprocal. I receive the
benefits of society, and therefore ought to promote its interests; but when I withdraw myself altogether from
society, can I be bound any longer? But allowing that our obligations to do good were perpetual, they have
certainly some bounds; I am not obliged to do a small good to society at the expence of a {19} great harm to
myself; why then should I prolong a miserable existence, because of some frivolous advantage which the public
may perhaps receive from me? If upon account of age and infirmities, I may lawfully resign any office, and
employ my time altogether in fencing against these calamities, and alleviating, as much as possible, the miseries
of my future life: why may I not cut short these miseries at once by an action which is no more prejudicial to
society? -- But suppose that it is no longer in my power to promote the interest of society, suppose that I am a
burden to it, suppose that my life hinders some person from being much more useful to society. In such cases, my
resignation of life must not only be innocent, but laudable. And most people who lie under any temptation to
abandon existence, are in some such situation; those who have health, or power, or authority, have commonly
better reason to be in humour with the world. ([editor's note] 4) {20}

    A MAN is engaged in a conspiracy for the public interest; is seized upon suspicion; is threatened with the
rack; and knows from his own weakness that the secret will be extorted from him: Could such a one consult the
public interest better than by putting a quick period to a miserable life? This was the case of the famous and brave
Strozi of Florence. -- Again, suppose a malefactor is justly condemned to a shameful death, can any reason be
imagined, why he may not anticipate his punishment, and save himself all the anguish of thinking on its dreadful
approaches? He invades the business of providence no more than the magistrate did, who ordered his execution;
and his voluntary death is equally advantageous to society, by ridding it of a pernicious member.

    THAT Suicide may often be consistent with interest and with our duty to ourselves, no one can question, who
allows that age, {21} sickness, or misfortune, may render life a burthen, and make it worse even than
annihilation. I believe that no man ever threw away life, while it was worth keeping. For such is our natural
horror of death, that small motives will never be able to reconcile us to it; and though perhaps the situation of a
man's health or fortune did not seem to require this remedy, we may at least be assured that any one who, without
apparent reason, has had recourse to it, was curst with such an incurable depravity or gloominess of temper as
must poison all enjoyment, and render him equally miserable as if he had been loaded with the most grievous
misfortunes. -- If suicide be supposed a crime, 'tis only cowardice can impel us to it. If it be no crime, both
prudence and courage should engage us to rid ourselves at once of existence, when it becomes a burthen. 'Tis the
only way that we can then be useful to society, by setting an example, which if imitated, would preserve to every
one his chance for happiness in life, {22} and would effectually free him from all danger of misery.5{23}