Sect. X. Of Miracles

PART I.

    There is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings, an argument against the
real presence, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any
argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy
of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that
learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of
tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who
were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he
proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the
Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our
senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was
no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to
their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their
testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker
evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the
doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture,
it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our
assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and
tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such
evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as
external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by
the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.
 
    Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind,
which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and
superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I
flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature,
which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting
check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will
be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will
the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred
and profane.

    Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning
matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not
altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into
errors. One, who in our climate, should expect better weather in any
week of June than in one of December, would reason justly, and
conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in
the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in
such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because
it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that
contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation.
All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes.
Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been
constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more
variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in
our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable
degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species
of moral evidence.

  A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In
such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he
expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his
past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event.
In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the
opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the
greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt
and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the
evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All
probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and
observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other,
and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the
superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty
on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a
hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory,
reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we
must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and
deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact
force of the superior evidence.

    To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may
observe that there is no species of reasoning more common, more
useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived
from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and
spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be
founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about
a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any
argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our
observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual
conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general
maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and
that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are
founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular
conjunction; it is evident that we ought not to make an exception to
this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any
event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. Were not the
memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an
inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not
sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I
say, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human
nature, we should never repose the least confidence in human
testimony. A man delirious, or noted for falsehood and villany, has no
manner of authority with us.

    And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony,
is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and
is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the
conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of
object has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number
of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of
this kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all
disputes, that may arise concerning them, is always derived from
experience and observation. Where this experience is not entirely
uniform on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in
our judgements, and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of
argument as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate
concerning the reports of others. We balance the opposite
circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and when we
discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it; but still with a
diminution of assurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist.

    This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be
derived from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary
testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the
manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all
these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of
fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few,
or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they
affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the
contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other
particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the
force of any argument, derived from human testimony.

  Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours
to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in
that case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a
diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less
unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and
historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a
priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed
to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is
such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a
contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the
other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate
on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of
experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the
testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of
assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from
which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoize, and
mutual destruction of belief and authority.

  I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato, was a
proverbial saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of that
philosophical patriot.* The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed,
might invalidate so great an authority.

  * Plutarch, Marcus Cato.

  The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations
concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally
required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that
arose from a state of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and
which bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had
constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to
his experience, they were not conformable to it.*

  * No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water did not
freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite
unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what
will result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of
which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy
what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be
confessed, that, in the present case of freezing, the event follows
contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian
would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual,
according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the
freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost
liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be
denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony to
render it credible to people in a war climate: But still it is not
miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature
in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants
of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and
the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they
never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they
cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence.

    But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony
of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm,
instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose
also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an
entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the
strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in
proportion to that of its antagonist.

    A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and
unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a
miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any
argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than
probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain
suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished
by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the
laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in
other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle,
if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle
that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden:
because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other,
has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle,
that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been
observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform
experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would
not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a
proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the
fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be
destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof,
which is superior.*

  * Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem to be contrary to
the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of
some circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in fact, it
is contrary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine
authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to
fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in
short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon
his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are
really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any
suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident,
there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If
this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a
transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to
nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an
influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a
law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the
interposition of some invisible agent. A miracle may either be
discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence.
The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle.
The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a
force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not
so sensible with regard to us.

    The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of
our attention), "That no testimony is sufficient to establish a
miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood
would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to
establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of
arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to
that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior."
When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I
immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that
this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact,
which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle
against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover,
I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the
falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event
which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command
my belief or opinion.