Problem of Evil
The idea here is that the existence of evil poses, at a minimum, a serious problem for traditional theism (the view that God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent).
God as the indirect source of evil
The traditional argument focuses not on evil directly done by god or done under his direct command, but on evil for which god may not be directly responsible. 'Evil' here refers not only to what may be called 'moral evil,' such as the effects of wars, crimes, vices etc., but also to what may be called 'natural evil,' such as the effects of natural calamities like earthquakes, disease, hurricanes, etc. There are two main versions of the argument, logical and evidential. The former tries to prove that the existence of god is logically incompatible with the existence of evil; the latter tries to prove that the existence of god is unlikely given the existence of evil.
Here's a rendition of the logical version. A properly eliminable evil is one that can be eliminated without thereby destroying a greater good or bringing into existence a greater evil.
1. God exists and
is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent.
2. Properly eliminable evil exists.
3. An omnibenevolent being would eliminate properly eliminable evil.
4. An omniscient being would know all about properly eliminable evil and how to
eliminate it.
5. An omnipotent being can do anything which is possible.
6. It is possible to eliminate at least some of the existing properly
eliminable evil.
7. (1)-(6) cannot all be true.
8. (2)-(6) are true
7. Hence, (1) is false; that is, either God does not exist, or God is not
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
Here are some possible theistic answers:
a. There is evil because of the Fall
Problems:
q Why the
Fall? This just moves the problem one
step back.
q Why should I pay
for the sins of my ancestors?
q Animals are not
descendants of Adam and Eve, can’t sin, and still they suffer
b. True, we don’t know a fully satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. So what? Why should we expect to know it, given our limitations?
c. We don’t know that (2) is true because lower level evil (pain and suffering, say) is necessary for higher level good (the virtues of benevolence and compassion, say) or our religious growth, and the lack of higher level goodness is worse than the presence of first level evil.
Problems:
q Quantity: how
much evil do we need to feel compassion?
q Is it morally
justifiable to make you suffer so that I may feel compassion?
q Higher level
vices caused by lower level evil?
q How much evil do
we need for religious growth?
d. We don’t know that (2) is true because moral evil is the result of a greater good, namely, free will
Problems:
q Does free will
require doing evil on a large scale?
q Isn’t the
capacity to do evil enough for free will?
The evidential version holds that (2)-(6) are likely to be true, and therefore that it’s likely that theism is false, unless there is good evidence to the contrary.
God as the direct source of evil
Some versions of the problem of evil address evil directly caused by god or done under his direct command. Here it is necessary to appeal to some specific revelation. As before, god is assumed perfect. But perhaps the assumption of goodness, or even decency, would suffice. Here are a few variations.
· The god of scripture is genocidal. Since god cannot be genocidal, the god of scripture does not exist.
Note: Lewis argues that we
cannot admire anyone who condones, or cheers on, such an awful injustice.