Virtue ethics

For both Mill and Kant the character of a moral agent, the sort of person he is, is secondary (this is especially clear in Kant, for whom a reluctant agent who nevertheless does the right thing out of duty embodies a high degree of morality). They propose an impersonal form of morality, based on the acceptance of certain rules of conduct (PU and CI). In general, they seem concerned with answering the question: “What should I do?” To some, this type of ethical system seems narrow and impersonal, and some ethicists have reproposed a type of ethical theory which dominated much of the ethical discussion in the classical world, namely virtue ethics (character ethics would be a more appropriate term). Instead of asking “What shall I do?”, character ethics asks “What kind of person should I be?”
We shall look at Aristotle's theory and then we'll discuss a specific virtue, courage, through the work of Plato and Aristotle.

Aristotle

Before looking at Aristotle, some general remarks on Greek ethics may help.

Greek ethics centers on two main notions, eudaimonia (happiness/ well-being/flourishing) and arete(virtue/excellence).
Happiness is not a subjective feeling of contentment. Rather it consists in the possession of what's desirable and incidentally produces contentment.
The list of excellencies humans can have extends beyond what we would qualify as moral; for example, ready with is an excellence for Aristotle.
The fundamental moral question for the Greeks is a self-interested one: “How should one live in order to achieve eudaimonia?”

Aristotle's theory.

1) Every action aims at some good; hence:

there must be a final good, otherwise our desire would be empty and vain.

the final good is happiness [eudaimonia] (flourishing captures Aristotle's sense better) as all agree.

So:

everything else is sought at least in part for the sake of happiness. For example, honor is sought both for its own sake and for the happiness is brings.
happiness is not sought for the sake of anything else.

2) What is happiness?

a. We know it is something

final
self sufficient
the end of action

the end of action

final and complete

b. We also know that happiness is the chief good for man. Hence, by finding out what the good for man is, we'll find out what happiness consists in. This is accomplished by what later philosophers have dubbed “the function argument.”

c. The function argument.
The basic idea of the function argument is that in order to determine what the good of X is, one has to know what sort of thing X is and what it does (Aristotle couches this in terms of determining the “function” of man).
For example, to determine the good of a leopard, one has to find out what sort of being it is and what activity is peculiar to it, what sets it apart from other animals (its a carnivore which kills such and such type of prey by stealth in such and such an environment, etc.)

man is a rational animal, and what's peculiar to it is an activity of the soul in accordance with rational principles.

the good of a thing is to do what's peculiar to it well, i.e., in accordance with virtue [arete] (“virtue” here is a misleading translation; what Aristotle means is something akin to excellence)
hence, the good of man is an activity of the soul in accordance with rational principles and the appropriate excellence (or excellencies if there are more than one).

d. To determine more precisely which activity of the soul is relevant to the good of man, we must look at the soul more closely. For Aristotle, the soul of man has three parts or functions:

the nutritive principle, which is responsible for basic biological functions (e.g., thermal regulation of the body, transformation of food into flesh and bones, etc). It is a-rational because it has no part in our mental life
the appetitive principle, which is responsible for our passions and emotions. It is partly irrational and partly rational because our emotions and how we feel about them can be influenced by reason.
the intellectual principle, which is intrinsically rational and is most clearly manifested in theorizing.

e. Hence, there are two types of excellence which are typically human and constitute the good of man:

intellectual excellence, which primarily manifests itself in theoretical knowledge
moral excellence (“character excellence” would be a more appropriate phrase), which deals with the rule over the passions and emotions through the molding of one's character.

3) Moral (character) excellence:

It is a child of habit: by doing good things we become good, bad things bad: by doing courageous things we become courageous. The situation is similar to that involving artistic skill, e.g., lyre playing.

It is neither produced in us by nature (one doesn't become a good man just like that, without training), nor against nature (moral excellence is not a straight-jacket which negates our natural instincts).
It is a state of character since passions or faculties per se are not blameworthy or praiseworthy.

4) Excess and deficiency destroy moral excellence.
Hence, moral excellence is the mean between two excesses determined by a rational principle which a man of practical wisdom would follow. For example, bravery is the mean between cowardice (too little daring) and foolhardiness (too much daring) which a man practical wisdom would follow.
Examples:

prodigality - liberality -meanness
vulgarity - magnificence - niggardliness
empty vanity - pride - humility
irascibility - good temperedness - inirascibility
foolhardiness - courage - cowardice
buffoonery - ready wit - boorishness

NOTE:

the idea of the mean should not be taken literally. It merely points to a structural feature of excellence, that is in-between opposite vices.
not all actions and passions admit of mean. For example, spite, envy, theft, murder, adultery do not admit of a mean because they are by nature extremes.

5) Merely performing virtuous acts does not amount to being virtuous. In order to achieve character excellence, the following must be the case:

the agent must know what he's doing.
the agent must will the action for its own sake.
the action must stem from a fixed and unchangeable character disposition.
the agent must take pleasure in performing the virtuous activity.

6) Moral excellence involves, then, choice: the agent must choose the right course of action for its own sake. But how does one know what to choose and, even more basically, what kind of person to be?
Aristotle tells us that moral excellence is the mean between two excesses determined by a rational principle which a man of practical wisdom would follow.
But what is practical wisdom? Aristotle is not forthcoming on this; however,

it involves a kind of cleverness or instrumental rationality (knowing how to achieve ends), but it it's not reducible to it because it involves being capable to choose the right ends.
it doesn't seem to involve a set of rules (e.g., PU or CI) ; rather, it's some sort of perception or insight about what to do.

7) Aristotle distinguishes among four types of agents on the basis of their character:

the wicked, who doesn't even know what the right action is and, even worse, what the human excellencies are (i.e. what type of person to be). He may think, for example, that prodigality is a virtue.
the weak willed, who knows what the human excellencies are, but fails to perform the right action either because his moral perception fails him, or because he is moved by contrary passions.

the strong willed, who knows what to do and what kind of person to be and acts correctly without, however, feeling any pleasure in it. He brings himself to do it, as it were, like Kant’s misanthrope who, however, conscientiously performs his duty towards humanity.
the virtuous, who knows what to do, what kind person to be, and being that kind of person feels pleasure in acting virtuously.

8) Since Aristotle has identified two types of human excellence, moral and theoretical, two issues arises, what their relation is, and which of the two is better.
Aristotle is not forthcoming on the first issue; there seem to be two options:

moral excellence is somehow a necessary condition of intellectual excellence and a part of it, so that moral excellence is possible without theoretical excellence but not vice versa.
they are separate excellencies.

However, Aristotle is clear on the second issue: he argues that intellectual excellence is better because:

the intellect is the best thing in us, and consequently the excellence most associated with it is the best.
intellectual excellence is

more temporally extended than other virtues because we can “contemplate the truth” at length
most pleasurable
most self-sufficient (little need of others)
most associated with leisure, as happiness should be.

NOTE: this seems to favor the view that moral excellence is a part of intellectual excellence, otherwise one would be justified in cultivating a bad character if that were necessary to pursue intellectual excellence.

9) The proud (magnanimous, i.e., great-souled) man seems to embody all that we find appealing (and offensive) about the Aristotelian view of the good life.

The magnanimous man is worthy of great things and knows it. He's concerned with honor (due recognition from other magnanimous men), which is the greatest of the external goods and is bestowed on those who perform great deeds.

the vain man thinks he's more worthy than he really is
the humble man thinks he's less worthy than he really is.

The magnanimous man must be distinguished from the temperate man, who is worthy of little and knows it. Magnanimity requires, among other things,

greatness in every virtue

goods of fortune, because they are needed to perform great things.
conferring benefits on others but being ashamed to receive them, because the former is the mark of the superior and makes other debtors
being dignified towards the powerful but unassuming towards the common people
acting only when great deeds are involved
being open in hate, love, and in speaking one's mind, because concealing them is cowardly
being self-sufficient, not bear grudges, not be gossipy, not be a flatterer
having a slow step and a deep voice, because the man who takes few things seriously is not likely to be hurried, and a shrill voice is sign of hurry and excitement.

is directly opposed to Christian humility
involves a great deal of “moral luck”: one must have the capacity (financial and otherwise) to act on a grand scale (in addition to a deep voice!).
crystallizes an aristocratic ideal which opposes the modern sense of equality. Hence, only a few can be truly virtuous, i.e., achieve the good for man, and even fewer can achieve blessedness, which requires the presence of favorable circumstances (on the rack one cannot be blessed). However, for Aristotle, virtue is recommended by reason, not by some moral law in the modern sense. (Compare this to Kant’s view of universal moral obligation and his related attempts, through his doctrine of the Good Will, to free morality from “moral luck”). So, it is hard to point at the great souled man as a contemporary moral ideal; and yet, it's also hard to deny that such a man is admirable (perhaps in an esthetic sense)