Morality has a long association with religion, and on most ethics panel there’s a minister.  So, it’s natural to ask whether morality essentially depends on religion.
Some philosophers (e.g., Anscombe) have argued as follows:

1. Contemporary morality uses the notion of moral obligation
2. The notion of moral obligation presuppose that of moral law
3. But a legalistic system of morality presupposes a law-giver.
4. However, laws and norms of human society and individual conscience won't do because they are often wrong, absurd and idiosyncratic, as history amply shows.
5. Hence, the only plausible law-giver left is God.
6. So, contemporary morality entails a divine law theory of obligation.

1. The basic meta-ethical issue of Divine Command Theory deals with

•  the relation between God’s commands and morality.
•  the role of God in moral knowledge
•  the role of God in moral motivation.

•  Right actions are right just because God approves of them and wrong actions are wrong just because God disapproves of them (theological    subjectivism).

Then, God is a legislator of morality; he decides what’s right or wrong in the same way in which the state decides what’s legal and what’s illegal.
Problems:
1. divine commands run the risk of being arbitrary.

NOTE: one cannot say that murder is forbidden by God because it’s wrong, if being wrong amounts to being forbidden by God.  That is, on what basis does God decide what’s wrong?  Obviously, not on a moral basis.
2. When religious people say that God is moral, they want to convey more  than a simple truism.  But this is possible only if God follows the moral  law, which, therefore, cannot depend on his will or promulgation.
3. If God commanded to kill the innocent, would murder still be wrong?  On mount Moriah, was Abraham a  murderous (i.e., a morally wrong) religious fanatic?  Many would answer “yes” to both question.

• God approves of right actions because they are right and disapproves of  wrong actions because they are wrong (theological objectivism).

Then, God is a mere transmitter of values (and not a very good one at that), much in the same way in which a math teacher is a transmitter of maths   which, however, do not depend on her.
Problem: Is theological objectivism sufficient to base a religious morality?  If God is a mere transmitter, what’s religious about morality?
 
• A way of reconciling theological subjectivism and theological objectivism.

God is absolutely perfect and so simple absolutely that all the divine properties are in fact one, and the distinction between substance and property doesn’t apply to God.
Hence:
1. "divine goodness," "divine power," etc. are intensionally different but extensionally equivalent, that is, they refer to the same thing, much like “the evening star” and “the morning star” both refer to Venus
2. "God is good, powerful, knowing, etc." must be understood as "God is goodness, power, knowledge etc."

iii. The role of God in moral motivation.
One might argue that the presence of a God who will punish and reward us in the afterlife on the basis of our deeds is a necessary component of moral motivation.
Problem: The issue is complicated because the question ”why be moral?” is difficult to answer.  However:

1. at a minimum one might argue that acting out of fear has little or no moral worth.  As Kant puts it, threats extort but fail to impose moral obligation.

NOTE: For Kant, even love for God would not be an adequate motivation for moral action.
2. as a matter of fact, many atheists behave morally without any fear of punishment in the afterlife.

1. Ethics is the science that teaches men their duty and the reasons for it.

2. The moral rightfulness of an action consists in its being in accordance with the will of  God.
NOTE: Hence, Paley is a theological subjectivist.  However, he denies that "God wills what's right" is a mere tautology because we get accustomed to think of what's right in abstraction from God's will.
Problem: But then, at a philosophical (analytical) level "God wills what's right" is tautological.

3. It is my duty to follow the will of God.  However, to explain the nature of duty, one must consider that of obligation: a man is obliged when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of  another.

•  the motive must be violent, i.e., it must present us with a very powerful inducement.
•  the motive must result from the command of another: self-inducement presents no obligation.

1. Satisfying our expectation of happiness is the reason (the justification) for obeying God.  Hence, he's a rational egoist (the rational course of action is that which maximises my self-interest).
2. However, usually we act out of habit or emotions, without thunking about God's will.  Hence, it's in my interest to cultivate a character which leads me to maximise general happiness (which, as we'll see is what God wants us to do) .
3. One might object that Paley confuses prudence with duty.  His reply is that  when we consider gains and losses in this world, we act out of prudence; when we consider gains and losses in the next one, we act out of duty.

Problem: the distinction seems too extrinsic.

1. by the authority of the scriptures. This method always takes precedence.

NOTE: however, Paley notes that the scriptures in no way can provide precise directives for the vast majority of cases.
2. by the light of nature, which lets us discern from God's general will and design in nature what we should do (this method is to be followed when revelation is silent, i.e. most of the times).

1. God did not make us to suffer, otherwise we would be full of sores and pains.
2. God was not indifferent to our happiness, otherwise there would be no explanation of our capacity to feel pleasure and of the many things which can  provide it.
3. But either God wished human suffering, or human happiness, or was indifferent   to both, or nature is the result of accident.
4. Nature is not the result of accident.
5.  Hence, God wished our happiness.

 NOTE: Paley was perhaps the best proponent of the argument from design which, if successful shows that (4) is true.

1. All the “contrivances” (organs) we are acquainted with are for a beneficial   purpose, e.g., teeth to chew, lungs to breathe, etc.

Problem: beneficial for what or whom?  Obviously the lion's teeth are not beneficial for the gazelle, and the “contrivances” which made the Spanish flu virus so successful were not for the benefit of people.
Reply: Elsewhere, Paleys' reply is that this problem is really the problem of evil, which he dismisses by appealing to the big-picture argument.
2. Evil is never the object of contrivance, although it may be an indirect consequence of it.  Teeth may ache, but they were not made to give us pain.  Contrast teeth to an instrument of torture.
3. Hence, God's wisdom in constructing contrivances was, and is, directed towards the beneficial purpose of establishing our happiness.

NOTE:
don't confuse Paley’s view with Utilitarianism;  for Utilitarianism, the reason an action is right is the amount of good it produces (or the rule would produce if all followed it); for Paley, by contrast, the reason an action is right is its conformity with the will of God.

8. Problems with Paley’s theory:

• Which texts or oral traditions constitute God's message to us? The Hebrew   Bible? The Christian Bible? If so, which version?  The Koran?  The Book of   Mormon?  Some other text in some other culture?  Moreover, how does one   decipher  God's will from the scriptures?
• Natural selection provides an alternative and better explanation of design in nature.
• Is it reasonable to ground one's morality on God's existence?  Am I more sure than God exists than, say, that murder is wrong?