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ABERFAN: DEATH FOR PROFIT

Stephen R. Fulk

On October 21, 1966, tragedy struck the town of Aberfan, Wales, in the United Kingdom when a huge pile of mine trailings (“tip”) slid down a mountain and crashed into the town. The slide partially buried the Pantglas Junior School, fatally crushing and suffocating 28 adults and 116 children.

Sociological theory, applied at both the macro and micro level, helps explain how this state crime occurred, as well as providing direction to prevent similar occurrences. The definition of a state crime used by Kauzlarich, Mullins, and Matthews (2000) includes the following requirements: The activity (or inactivity) generates harm to people or property, it is it the product of activity or inactivity on behalf of the state or state agencies, it relates directly to an implicit or explicit trust or duty of the state; it is committed, or omitted, by a governmental agency, organization or representative; and it is committed in the self-interest of the state and/or the elite groups controlling the state. This definition applies to the Aberfan disaster: clearly there was harm; though the mines had originally been private, they been nationalized and were under the purview and control of the National Coal Board (NCB), members of the NCB were representatives of the government who were charged with protecting the safety of residents (Report, 1967, 32,37,39). The fifth and final element of the definition will be discussed later in this article.

Before the tip piles were built above Aberfan, no geological surveys were taken to ensure the safety or stability of placing tip piles on the mountainside directly above the town. In the Report of the Tribunal that looked into the disaster, the NCB General Manager of the region that included Aberfan stated that no surveys were taken:

(I)t has never been the practice. I have been in management ever since 1940 and

I have never known the practice to keep an up-to-date plan of tipping. The only

time they have been surveyed is when there has been some reconstruction necessary…

In other words, they are not surveyed regularly and consistently (Report, 1967, 31).

Another witness stated that although there had been much survey work done in surrounding areas, “…Merthyr Vale,” the area above Aberfan, “seems to be rather a gap in that respect” (Report, 1967, 31).

The tip had also slid twice before, in May 1963 and November 1963. Though no one was directly harmed (Austin, 1969: 9), these shifts indicated a potential danger. Letters of protest about flooding and other dangers relating to Tip 7 were sent to the NCB and others in authority before the disaster (Report, 1967: 56-57), including a letter from the local Borough and Waterworks Engineer in 1963 (Frost, 1996, no page; Report, 1967, 55; and Austin, 1967, 9-10). These letters were not acted upon or ignored.

In late 1966, the pending danger became a reality. On October 20, 1966, workers noticed that the top of Tip 7 had sunk in about 8-10 feet. The following morning, the top had sunk an additional 10-12 feet. This information was carried by runner to the mine authorities – the only means of communication from the tip to the mine and, by extension, the town below – as previously stolen telephone wires had never been replaced (England, 1967: 16). No mention of the dangerous change in the tip was communicated to the unsuspecting town below. Approximately two hours later, just before 9:30 a.m., an entire section of the tip began to slide down the mountainside. Two workers ran down the mountain in an effort to warn the town, but they were unable to keep up with the speed and momentum of the slide. The slide destroyed the few houses up-mountain from the school, and then slid across a road, a drainage canal, barely clipped the high school, and crashed head-on into Pantglas Junior School, instantly burying over one hundred and twenty students and teachers.[1]

Though there were physical warning signs, and both warnings and questions sent up-channel, there were few, if any, preventative or corrective measures taken to avert the disaster. From the preventative measure arena, the site of the tip itself is suspect. The area receives a large amount of rainfall annually, and “Water is undoubtedly the root cause of most failures,” a conclusion presented to the Tribunal after the disaster (Report, 1967, 18). Others reported that: “We have discovered water welling up in the virtual centre of the tip - a natural spring which was completely unknown. This spring has been pouring its water into the centre of the tip producing what an official has described as a water bomb” (Frost, 1966, no page).

Additionally, from the Tribunal Report:

(In the area of Tip 7) the course of these streams and the location of some of the springs

are clearly shown on three Ordinance Survey maps prepared before tipping began on Merthyr

Mountain. The earliest survey was in 1873 and the map published in 1874 at a scale of 1 in 2,500.

There was a second survey in 1898 and the map published in 1900, being again revised in 1914

and published in 1919. These three maps all show the same streams in the area where tipping subsequently took place (emphasis added)(Report, 1967: 19).

Tip 7 was not started until Easter, 1958. This is well after all three maps were available and is in conflict with the statements of those responsible who stated they were unaware of a spring or stream in the area of Tip 7. Local residents were well aware of the springs and stated that anyone could see them. A witness at the Tribunal stated, “Streams were always there…before Tip 7 was started” (Report, 1967: 19). In addition, the tippers who worked at the mine got their drinking water from the spring itself at the foot of the newly-begun Tip 7 before the spring was covered by the expanding footprint of the tip. Not only had citizens written, questioned, and complained, officials and employees at the colliery itself had sent up warning flags (Report, 1967: 32). These, too, were ignored or given extremely low priority - the coal had to be mined and a profit turned (Report, 1967: 25, and Bayliss, 1969: 11-12).

Immediately following the tip slide, officials began scrambling to find where to place blame while attempting to ensure that they, themselves, were not included in the implciated group. John Humphrys, a British television personality, hosted a conference on “corporate killing” in 2001 in which he highlighted this very point:

And the way we saw people in authority, the people who ran the National Coal Board as it

was then, ducking and diving and lying and behaving in a disgraceful way was a salutary lesson

for all of us. And my own view is that, for some of us it was perhaps then we began to look at

this whole area of corporate responsibility in a serious way (Transcript, 2001, no page).

England (1967: 53) reports the following exchange: “On every lip: ‘Why weren’t past warnings heeded?’ A colliery official admitted: ‘It’s a very embarrassing question.’” Because of the malfeasance and negligence expressed and exposed in the following days, “(A) father demanded that the cause of death (of his child in the Pantglas School ) was recorded as ‘Buried alive by the National Coal Board. That is what I want to see on the record. That is the feeling of those present. Those are the words we want to go on the certificate’ (sic)’’ (England, 1967: 66, and HTV Wales, 1966).

The physical occurrence was straight-forward and the cause has been described variously as “a build up of water in the tip…facilitated by liquefaction” (Bristol, 1999) and “liquefaction…took place partly due to the fact the material had a high potential for liquefaction” (Kay, no date). But the physical attributes were not the actual cause of the disaster– the disaster was caused by the actions and inactions by people and organizations.

The following is a summary of actions taken and attempts to avoid blame and responsibility for the deaths of 116 children. This is only the tip of the iceberg in that many different organizations were involved in the investigation of the disaster.

Just 5 days after the disaster, the British Parliament formed a Tribunal to investigate the slide. The following information is from the Report of that Tribunal (1967) unless otherwise cited.

The Tribunal found that there were numerous possible causes of the disaster, including abnormal rainfall, earthquakes, mine subsidence, the presence of springs, and others (114-116). While some of these may have contributed the event, the Tribunal found the following:

I. Blame for the disaster rests upon the National Coal Board…This blame is shared (though in varying degrees) among the National Coal Board headquarters, the South Western Divisional Board, and certain individuals.

II. There was a total absence of tipping policy and this was the basic cause of the disaster. In this respect, however, the National Coal Board was following in the footsteps of their predecessors. They were not guided either by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Mines and Quarries or by legislation.

III. There is no legislation dealing with the safety of tips in force in this or any country, except in part of West Germany and in South America. (131)

The Tribunal seemed to go out of its way to imply in paragraph III that no one was criminally negligent, since almost no one had any legal responsibility, as evidenced by the lack of legislation worldwide. The reasoning seems to be that if there is no law, there can be no criminal conduct or responsibility. Also, paragraph II seems to be a way of stating that “we have always done it this way” as a defense.

In addition, R. W. Bayless (1969: 44) of the University of Birmingham found that:

(it) became clear that all the accidents had deep-rooted origins and that…this could be

traced of a pattern of behavior that had been imprinted into the organisation over a very

long period of time. There was also a two-fold causal effect. 1) The lack of effective policy

by those at the Top…2) The failure in communication from those at the Bottom…

By combining these factors, Bayless shows a complete breakdown of organizational policy and effectiveness that led directly to this disaster. Further, “(c)ausal features are rigidities in institutional beliefs, … neglect of outside complaints, multiple information-handling difficulties, … failure to comply with regulations, and a tendency to minimize emergent danger (Turner, 1976: 378).

Johnes and McLean researched why no person was held responsible for the disaster. They found that:

Our archival research tended to confirm that Aberfan was a disaster of corporatism.

(t)he failure to hold anybody responsible was rooted in the 'high politics' of the 1960s and

1970s. Government needed the leaders of the National Coal Board (NCB) for a national

policy purpose, namely running down the coal industry without provoking strikes. As the

NCB leadership knew that governments believed them to be indispensable, they were

able to behave in the ways … (described elsewhere) (emphasis added) (2001).

Corporatism and a desire to avoid strikes while maintaining profitability of mining satisfies the fifth and final element of the definition of a state crime previously discussed.

While the Report does not hold anyone criminally responsible, this was based on a lack of statutes. However, human rights issues are universal, and using that standard as a baseline, these individuals were very likely guilty of negligence at the very least.

A Multi-Level Theoretical Interpretation

Many different sociological theories could be used to explain the actions and inactions of the people responsible for this event. However, an integrated approach allows one to consider the factors present at all levels of investigation: micro, meso, and macro. An integrative approach may lead to a better understanding and a more effective path leading to lessen the likelihood of a similar occurrence in the future (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998: 148-151). This multi-level approach to understanding how the Aberfan disaster occurred is further supported and amplified by Piquero and Piquero (2001: 337):

A complete understanding of the sources and characteristics of white-collar and corporate

crime must not rely on one level of analysis to the exclusion of another; instead, scholars must

recognize the potential usefulness of all levels of analysis, since by definition the study of white-

collar crimes within organizations necessitates a hierarchal analysis.

At the micro level, Tittle’s Balance Control Theory is useful in explaining the actions or, in this case, inactions, of those in authority. By having an imbalance between the autonomy the actors have when compared with the amount of control others have over them, deviant behavior is more likely to occur. According to Tittle, if the balance of control is tilted in the direction of autonomy, then certain types of deviance are more likely to occur, including exploitation. The personnel of the NCB were highly autonomous, and therefore would be more likely to engage in exploitative behavior (Barlow and Kauzlarich, 2002). Not acting to ensure the safety of workers and their families is exploitation.

In addition, in this case, the bond felt by the authorities could have been stronger to peers and coworkers than it was to the general public, therefore, the individuals involved chose through rational means to act as they did, allowing an unsafe practice to begin and continue until the disaster happened. This rational choice explanation is well developed by both Vaughan (1998) and by Paternoster and Simpson (1992). Vaughan (1998: 237) writes that we must understand the rational choices people make based on more than just the individual while Paternoster and Simpson (1992: 197-205) have created a model of decision-making based on rational choices. Therefore, it is easy to see that this rational choice was not based solely on the internal makeup of the individuals, as all of these authors argue: There were other factors at work.

At the meso level, the organizational structure, the bureaucracy, and the cultural norms of the NCB and the mine itself all contributed to inaction of the part of those responsible. If all those around a person are acting in a similar manner, one is more likely to act that way, too, as was proven by the Asche experiments (Baxter, no date). Also, as Milgram demonstrated, people obey authority figures well past the level of deviance that they would consider for themselves (Goret, et. al., 1998). Therefore, if the dominate culture within the NCB and within the mine itself were conducive to deviant behavior, then those within that structure would be much more likely to engage in deviant behavior. However, they would not consider it deviant in that this behavior was the norm within that setting. Since the goal of both groups (the NCB and the mine itself) were geared towards profit and keeping their holds on the power and authority they had, cutting corners and keeping costs to an absolute minimum were encouraged. Therefore, a single individual would make rational choices based on the culture and norms within the group. These choices would include whether or not to act on information received, whether action or inaction would lead to promotion or dismissal, and may have included being labeled as a pejorative “straight arrow” or “do-gooder” by those attempting to maintain the (deviant) norms of the group. Further, strain theory (both Merton’s and Agnew’s) could account for much of the same inaction. According to some of the more recent applications of Merton to organizational crime (1968: 195-203), the strain felt between turning a profit and not having legal and effective means to do so would influence individuals and organizations to then turn to the only means available, illegitimate ones (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998). They would turn to innovation to achieve the goals that were socially acceptable but not attainable through acceptable means – in this case, pleasing the boss (micro) or turning a profit (meso/macro) (Kammeyer, et al, 1990, 169; Barlow and Kauzlarich, 2002). It is also possible, a la Agnew (1992: 57), that at the micro/individual level, the positive feelings and rewards those in positions of authority received would be threatened if they did not act in the way expected, leading to a strain that would encourage them to act as they did and to again uphold the group norms (Barlow and Kauzlarich, 2002).

At the macro level, the capitalist system in place in England drove all companies and nationalized industries towards increasing or maintaining their profit margins, often at the cost of worker safety. Bayliss (1969: 5) refers to this when he writes: “The Coal Industry (sic) has been one of decline over a protracted period…The Industry had set itself a production target which, with falling demand, it was unable to maintain.” An organization operating and existing in this environment could be coerced (even unintentionally) into actions that were unsafe and deadly. The basic tenet of capitalism, extracting excess value from labor, led directly to the deaths of innocent children. As Macionis (1987: 204) explains: “As the ‘backbone of the capitalist system,’ corporations exert immense power…” This would obviously also hold even truer for nationalized businesses, in that they are officially part of the governmental apparatus. Further, modern capitalistic societies place great emphasis on individualism, leading those in positions of power to believe they are entitled to do as they wish, without regard to culturally accepted norms (Stewart, 1981: 272). This fits in well with the previously discussed balance control theory of Tittle in that lack of control over their individual behavior could lead some to a belief in entitlement. This entitlement could easily become a source for deviance. For example,

Complaints about “government interference” in the free market are, of course, common in

the business community, and business leaders often use the ideology of laissez-faire capitalism

to criticize laws and regulations that they consider inappropriate (Coleman, 1987: 344).

It is a short step from criticizing to violating, especially given the high probability of not being caught, censured, or punished.

Today’s environment is not that much changed from that of England in 1966. All of the causes and underlying social foundations are virtually the same here in the U.S. as were there then. While the socioeconomic and political systems of the two countries differ, both are highly capitalistic. Well-publicized and widely-known examples from recent history point out the lack of progress in keeping this kind of activity from occurring: Ford’s Pinto decision, Bridgestone/Firestone’s tire debacle, the Challenger disaster, Three Mile Island, political (President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, presidential pardons, and President Bush’s secrecy in policy-making meetings, for example) and economic (ENRON and Global Crossing bankruptcies and the downfall of Arthur Andersen) scandals, and numerous unsafe product and food recalls all point to a continuing need for change. On a more local level here in the St. Louis metro area, environmental pollution at Times Beach (Mo) and Herculaneum (Mo) point to an unchanged environment and culture. Aberfan could happen again today. It is critical that we consider what should be done.

Deterrence – swift and sure punishment for offenders – would help swing the balance of costs and benefits move heavily to the cost side of the equation. This deterrence could be both for individuals and the organizations in which they are immersed. Braithwaite and Geis (1989: 367-372) state that while deterrence is neither perfect nor able to work in a vacuum, punishment can be effective in reducing crimes committed by individuals and organizations. They also state that deterrence may be more effective in dealing with white-collar and state crimes than with traditional “street” crimes, based on the incapacitating effects of deterrent punishments compared to traditional crimes. This would help reduce deviance at the micro level and possibly at the meso level, as organizations and corporations can be sanctioned.

In fact, for many years, English law did not allow the criminal prosecution of organizations for murder and related crimes, because, according to Murray Wright (1970):

the common law position until very recently was generally that a company or corporation,

as distinct from an individual working within it, could not be guilty of unlawful homicide. It

was held that a company could not be guilty of murder because, again until very recently,

the mandatory penalty for murder was either death or life imprisonment and neither penalty

applied to a company.

However, now organizations can be charged and tried in a way similar to individuals. Therefore, on the meso level, deterrence may be a factor. On the other hand, a further form of deterrence may be available at this (and somewhat at the micro) level – that of rehabilitative shaming. If individuals and organizations can be shamed for prior actions, and then reintegrated into society, then the likelihood of a repetition of similar behavior is greatly reduced. Braithwaite (2001) writes that “when shaming is done within a cultural context of respect for the offender, it can be an extraordinarily powerful, efficient and just form of social control.” Organizationally, this could include “negative publicity for the corporation; a perceived loss of the company’s ‘good name’ and reputation; and (close personal contacts who) devalue and disapprove of the individual” (Paternoster and Simpson, 1992: 200). However, Benson (1998: 381-388) argues well that these forms of deterrence are very limited. Lack of resources, competing priorities within the governmental agencies, lack of legal standing and actions available, and other such remedies and deterrents hinder social control of state deviance.

At the macro level, the cultural and political environment in which the disaster occurred must be taken into account. As Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998: 146) state::

the structure of corporate capitalism, as an economic system, provides the major impetus toward organizational crime. Capitalism provides major incentives for organizations to use illegitimate means to achieve profit or create the conditions under which capital accumulation may take place.

However, it is not just profit that drives an organization to deviancy. A desire to survive and grow (self-preservation and domination) in and of itself can lead to illegitimate means. Also, the political and social climate that differentiates between white-collar or state crimes and traditional street crimes (and the sanctions imposed on each) lessens the perceived costs of possibly deviant behavior. As Simon points out: “(I)t is quite clearly a product of our complex society, as a number of forces work together to provide the motive, the opportunity, and the structure necessary for deviance to occur” (2002, 319). However, Simon (2002: 326) goes on to advocate that “the utilities, owners and processors of natural resources, transportation, banks, and credit institutions should be nationalized...” In the Aberfan case, it was a nationalized mining company that allowed the disaster to occur. Merely having the government take over an organization does little to change the behavior of the organization itself or the people within it. The current example of security screeners at our airports is a good example – federalizing them was to end security lapses. However, news reports are full of these lapses. It is not, then, the ownership that counts – it is the overall cultural, political, and sociological environment that counts. As Vaughan (1998: 239) argues: “(D)ecisionmaking…cannot be disentangled from social context, which shapes preferences and thus what an individual perceives as rational.”

Given the facts in this case and the actions of those responsible, it is obvious that society itself must be changed to prevent the seeds of another Aberfan from sprouting. Using the ideas from the political economy perspective, one can foretell the changes required. As Leslie (1897) writes when discussing political economies:

The economic structure of any given community, the direction taken by national energies,

the occupations of the different classes and of both sexes, the constituents and the partition

of movable and immovable property, the progressive, stationary, or retrogressive condition

in respect of productive power and the quantity and quality of the necessaries, comforts, and

luxuries of life, are the results not of special economic forces, but of all the social forces, political,

moral, and intellectual, as well as industrial.

This means that the overarching political, economic, and social systems must be taken into account when describing an action (or inaction) by any member of that group. Indeed: “Perhaps the most basic cause of elite deviance is the structure and internal workings of the contemporary political economy” (Simon, 2002: 290). Therefore, to change the probability of that same (or similar) event occurring again, one must change the political, social, and economic system that allowed or encouraged it in the first place. In the case of Aberfan, the profit-driven nature of the English economy would have to be changed to lower the drive for capital attainment. The social system would have to be altered to create a more deviance-intolerant society. The political system would have to be revamped to reduce the obedience to authority that was so well documented by the aforementioned Milgram experiments and the autonomy many feel in their positions within the organizations. Although the U.S. and British systems are different, they are both market economies, both capitalistic in nature, and therefore, what is true for one is likely true for the other. As is implicit in the term “macro,” these changes would result in a new social order and would require a major upheaval of the status quo. Simon (2002, 322-324) uses the term “economic democracy” to describe this new social order. Interim steps until that new order is reached could help reduce deviancy. Some of the ones most likely to be effective include employees being given more power and a “check and balance” role in corporations and reducing dramatically corporate political contributions and, by extension, their power over lawmaking.

Conclusion

Gravity and water caused the tip above Aberfan to give way, crashing down the mountainside into Pantglas School, taking away 144 lives. Although gravity is constant and water is abundant, this did not have to happen. Humans had many chances to intervene and failed miserably to do so. From the site of Tip 7, through the minor slides that it experienced, to the warning signs plainly visible on October 21, there were abundant opportunities to avert the disaster. The warnings and questions raised by the village inhabitants themselves went unheeded. This paper has shown that this event does fulfill all of the elements of a state crime, but can be studies as an analogous social harm. Negligence caused the deaths of these children, as surely as did gravity. No one was punished. No one was held accountable. No social controls worked.

The same thing could happen again today. Too many want to legislate fixes, thinking this is enough. However, as Hicks (1968: 94) writes:

The recommendations of the Tribunal that tip control should be determined by codes of

practice and by regulations is important and perhaps necessary. It has to be remembered,

however, that the coal-mining industry has been bedevilled (sic) for a hundred years or more

by safety regulations piled on safety regulations. This is the way of management by directive

and is inherently suspect (Emphasis added).

Placing a band-aid on a gaping wound is not the answer.

This article has attempted to show the root causes of this disaster. By using an integrative approach, by examining the individual, his or her immediate surroundings, and the political, social, and economic structure in which he or she operates, this paper has shown that there are various and interrelated causes for deviancy. In addition, little in the way of state-crime deterrence has been done at the micro, meso, or macro level. But if we change the cost-benefit analysis for individuals and organizations, if we use shaming and rehabilitation, and if we undertake a major renovation of the current political, economic, and social system under which we operate, we may be able to positively reduce the likelihood of another Aberfan disaster. Our children not only deserve our best efforts, they require them.

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Stephen Fulk is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville. His email is sfulk@siue.edu

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[1] This entire description is from Johnes and McLain, 2001; HTV Wales, 1966; Austin, 1967; Miller, 1974; and Bayliss, 1969. All give very similar accounts of the actual events.