© 2002 The Edwardsville Journal of Sociology,
Volume 2. back to ejs volume 2
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Folk
Devils in Seattle
Darla Hernandez
Nestled in the Pacific Northwest, Seattle, Washington is a large
metropolitan city of approximately 600,000 residents. It experiences the same
trials and tribulations as other large cities: deteriorating inner city
neighborhoods, lack of jobs that pay a living wage, failing school districts in
poor neighborhoods, and juvenile delinquency. In August 2001, National Public
Radio featured the city because of the efforts of a McDonald's business owner
and the University Avenue Business Association. Both parties acted
contemporaneously, but independently, of each other in implementing an
innovative method designed to deter the loitering of working class and homeless
youth. Ironically enough, the entities implemented the same means to
deter the street youth. The methods
involved stereo equipment and continuously playing music. This paper seeks to
describe unwritten practices businesses owners in Seattle implemented in
reaction to the failure of local law enforcement agencies to curtail juvenile
delinquency in two locales. Furthermore, the paper grounds the business owners'
practices in two criminological theories and evaluates the utility of the
innovative deterrence strategy.
The policy described in this article is an informal one executed
by two parties acting independently of one another. The two parties are a
McDonald's owner and the Business Association of University Avenue. The
implementation of the policy by the two parties resulted from the said parties
frustration with local law enforcement agencies’ inability to prevent homeless
youth and loitering youth from congregating on the sidewalks in front of their
business establishments. The informal policy enacted by the two parties is
innovative in nature. The policy involved affixing stereo equipment to their
business establishments. The parties then chose a musical selection to be
played 24 hours a day that the intended targets would find unpleasant. The
expected outcome was to deter the street youth from “hanging out” on the
sidewalks in front and around their stores.
It is important to understand how the parties became innovators.
The McDonald's owner had developed a relationship with the Seattle Police
Department as a result of a number of calls placed to the department over the
congregating youth. While the police department would send officers to the
McDonald's to disband the youths, this action only yielded temporary results.
Often times, within an hour of a police officers response to the McDonald's
service call, the youths would return (Ballinger 2001b). The police department
met with the McDonald's owner to discuss possible solutions. The police
department suggested to the owner a technique discussed at an annual police
conference (Ballinger 2001b). The technique involved the mounting of stereo
speakers and blaring music that the youths would find annoying and unpleasant.
After the McDonald's owner decided to act upon the police department’s
suggested method of deterrence, the department offered possible musical
selections that they felt the youths would deem unbearable (Ballinger 2001b).
Since the police department routinely responded to the McDonald's owner's
service calls the department had a composite of the youth and homeless culture
known to loiter in front of the establishment. The police department acted upon
stereotypical assumptions about black youth culture; that all young black
males' listen to rap music (O'Neill 1997). The police department hypothesized
that the antithesis of rap music is country (Ballinger 2001b). The McDonald's
owner developed a format of country music selections to blare from the stereo
speakers mounted underneath the overhang of the building (Ballinger 2001b).
The Business Owners Association of University Avenue arrived at
the decision to use music as a means to deter loitering without the aid of the
Seattle Police Department. The Business Owners Association’s innovative
decision was two-fold: 1) it would create a positive shopping environment for
their existing customers and entice former customers to frequent their business
once again and, 2) the innovation would have an important latent effect--deter
the street youths from hanging out on the sidewalks on the "Ave" (Ballinger
2001b). Since many of the loitering youths on the "Ave" were
homeless, punks, grunge rockers and drug users, the Business Association felt
that that by playing classical music it would evoke a feeling of being in an
upscale environment and that the youths would hate it (Ballinger 2001b).
The first proprietor to affix stereo equipment to their storefront
was a McDonald's located on the corner of 3rd and Pine Street in
downtown Seattle. The location of the McDonald's was several blocks away from a
quasi-upscale shopping center. Located directly in front of the McDonald's is a
covered mass transit shelter. The shelter, for obvious reasons attracted mass
transit users but more importantly, it served as a central congregation center
for homeless and loitering youth. This frustrated the owner of the McDonald's
because patrons of the McDonald's were unable to enter the restaurant because
of the inability to penetrate the thick crowd of youth and/or out of fear of
the loitering youth.
The second set of proprietors to implement the innovative strategy
was the Business Owners Association of University Avenue. Several months after
the McDonald's owner had installed his anti-loitering strategy the Business
Association rallied together and decided to affix stereo equipment of their
own. Instead of installing stereo equipment to each storefront, they decided to
affix the audio equipment at three central locations throughout University
Avenue (Ballinger 2001b). The effect created from the three audio stations
resulted in music continuously heard throughout entire stretch of University
Avenue.
The practice of mounting audio speakers on storefronts in shopping
districts in large metropolitan cities is deeply rooted in the classical school
of deterrence as well as a more contemporary theory of rational choice. The
classical school of deterrence is based on the presuppositions of the
utilitarian philosophies of the 17th and 18th century.
Modern theories of deterrence, to a certain extent, possess a central precept
of the classical school, which argues that individuals are rational and exercise
free will.
Rational
Theories
Rational theories explaining criminal and deviant behaviors were
born in the late 1970s and 1980s. As with any theoretical development, it
reflected the socio-political times in which it emerged. The rational
criminological theories that emerged during the late 1970s and 1980s reflect
the conservative political and social ideology of that era. According to
Williams and McShane (1999: 233), the socio-political times preceding the
development of and during the course of the emergence of rational theories was,
" . . . a period of conservative thought, politics, and economic
policies." The socio-political
ideology of this era had a significant effect on crime control strategies and
the treatment of criminal offenders. The American public supported the United
States government's waging war on crime (Williams and McShane 1999). Moreover,
the lay populace supported the expansion of the criminal justice system,
harsher punishment of criminal offenders and the construction of more prisons
(Williams and McShane 1999). But, most importantly the lay populace supported
the common explanation of criminal behavior and the solution to criminality:
criminals are criminals because they are inherently bad and should "be
punished because they 'deserve it'" (Williams and McShane 1999:233). In
short, these socio-political forces inevitably shaped the criminological
theorists' writing during this period.
Confronted with how to resolve theoretically, and ultimately
explain, the criminal type, criminological scholars began developing what we
now call rational theories of criminality. According to Williams and McShane,
". . . scholars returned to some of the central ideas of the old Classical
School: rational humans, deterrence, and punishment" (1999:234). Those "central
ideas" encapsulate the writings of the classical theorists' such as,
Bentham, Beccaria, Montesquieu and Hobbes. Thomas Hobbes detailed many such
ideas in his famous work The Leviathan. On the issue of punishment
Hobbes wrote:
. . . It belongeth also to the Office of
the Sovereign, to make a right application
of Punishments,
and Rewards. And seeing the end of
punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but
correction, either of the offender, or
of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to be
inflected for those Crimes, that are of
the most Danger to the Publique . . . (389)
Hobbesian notions of punishment exemplify not only the political
climate of the late 1970s and 1980s and the lay populous, but also a sect of
criminological theorists of the day. There is no apparent difference between
Hobbes writings in 1651 and the rhetoric of the late 1970s and 1980s. The
solution to America's crime problem laid in stricter punishments in order to
deter the rational and hedonistic criminal for the greater good of the American
public (Williams and McShane 1999). Thus, the emerging perspective embodied and
embraced the classical notions as to the explanations of criminality,
deterrence and punishment.
The result of the socio-political forces during this period was a
perspective that placed the individual at the center of analysis. More over,
the perspective used a multi-disciplinary approach that utilizes elements of
psychology, sociology and economics to explain the cognitive thought process of
individuals who decide to engage in a criminal act (Williams and McShane 1999).
One of the seminal works of this era was an article by Gary S. Becker entitled,
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." According to some, Becker's article had a
significant impact on the burgeoning rational theories of the late 1970s and
1980s (Cullen and Agnew 1999). In this work, Becker expounds the classical
notion of humans' hedonistic tendencies and links it with humans' ability to
perform cognitive calculations. According to Becker, " . . . a person
commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could
get by using his time and other resources at other activities . . ."
(Becker 1999:252). For Becker, an individual engages in a criminal and/or deviant
act after some form of mental calculation of the expected utility and
probability of conviction (Becker 1999). Becker's influential piece undoubtedly
impacted criminologists who later would come to develop the rational choice
model of criminality.
Two criminologists, Derek B. Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke, sought
create a theoretical framework in which to guide research pertaining to
criminal and/or deviant behavior in order to yield successful crime prevention
strategies (Cornish and Clarke 1986; 1987). The theoretical construct they
created is commonly referred to as the rational choice model (Williams and
McShane 1999). The rational choice model starts with two assumptions. The first
is that, individuals engage in criminal and/or deviant behavior in order to
benefit themselves (Cornish and Clarke 1986). The second, the offender " .
. . exhibit[s] a measure of rationality" (Cornish and Clarke 1986). Two
intertwined spheres characterize the rest of the rational choice model:
involvement decisions and event decisions. Involvement decisions are the
choices an offender makes. These decisions involve the decision to begin a
criminal act, follow through with the criminal act or to cease the criminal act
(Cornish and Clarke 1986). The event decisions are choices made during the
duration of the criminal act. These decisions involve choices about how the
criminal act is executed (Cornish and Clark 1986). The important contribution
of the rational choice model put forth by Cornish and Clarke is the model's utility
in providing policy makers with a guide to developing, " . . . crime
prevention and control (Cornish and Clarke 1987: 944)."
Situational
Crime Prevention Strategies of Proprietors in Seattle, Washington
When proprietors of two locals in downtown Seattle were unable to
receive relief from law enforcement agents enforcing the city's loitering
statutes to disband congregating youth, the proprietors' sought their own
remedy with the help of the local Seattle police department. The proprietors in
two different locales independently decided to mount stereo speakers to the
storefronts of their shops. The audio equipment was then used to play music
that was in direct opposition to the loitering youths' musical preferences.
These actions by the proprietors are an example of the application of
situational crime prevention strategies informed by the rational choice model
put forth by Cornish and Clarke.
Situational crime prevention involves careful examination of the
properties of the offenses and choice-structuring properties: "Decisions to offend . . . are influenced by the characteristics
of both the offenses and offenders, and are the product of the two (Cornish and
Clarke 1987)." Thus, the interplay between the offenses and offenders are
a parsimonious and abstracted way of articulating the rational choice model as
it relates to situational crime prevention strategies. It is arguable that
"properties of offenses" are the involvement component to the
rational choice model. Properties of offenses are the cognitive process of
determining the expected utility of a particular criminal event (Cornish and
Clarke 1986; 1987). When a motivated offender reaches the juncture in their
cognitive contemplation where the environment renders the criminal act "differentially
attractive" the hope is that the offender will cease the completion of the
criminal act. The key, then, to effective situational crime prevention is to
make the environment "differentially attractive" to the offender. In
the case of Seattle, local proprietors attempted to render the environment
surrounding their business establishment "differentially attractive"
to the loitering youth by deliberately blaring music the youth would find
unpleasant.
An Alternative
Theoretical Explanation
Moral Panics and
the Demonization of Seattle's Youth
The reactions of business proprietors and law enforcement agents
in Seattle towards loitering youth is best understood by examining the youth
culture-delinquency nexus. This
exposes the interactions between the business owners, agents of social control,
media and the members of the local community. Stanley Cohen’s work on moral
panic provides a useful framework through which to explore the interactions
between the social actors in Seattle.
Cohen's book Folk Devils and Moral
Panics was the first to, "systematically outline both the
indicators/elements of, as well as the actors involved, in a moral panic . .
." (Muzzatti 2002:1). Using the theoretical framework outlined by Cohen
can offer insights into the situational crime prevention strategies imposed by
the business owners that the rational choice model is unable to provide.
The concept of moral panic has roots in interactionist and
conflict schools as well as a blend of cultural, labeling and subcultural
theories. Cohen defined a moral panic as, "A condition, episode, person or
group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and
interests . . ." (Cohen 1990:9; original 1972). Articulated differently, a
moral panic can be conceptualized as
the distortion of social actors that within certain circumstances can become to
be defined as a social problem (McCorkle and Miethe 2002). Thus, a moral panic
is an episode, where social actors then come to be defined as a threat or
problem and in turn labeled as such.
To expose the youth culture-delinquency nexus in Seattle and make
visible the social actors involved, it is necessary to examine the sets of
actors that are involved in the creation of a moral panic: the six sets of actors are: 1) folk devils;
2) rule enforcers; 3) the media; 4) politicians; 5) the public; and 6) action
groups (Cohen 1990; original 1972). The first sets of actors are the folk
devils. Cohen defines the folk devils as " visible reminders of what we
should not be" (1990; original 1972). Thus, the loitering youth in Seattle
embody everything good law-abiding citizens are not. The consumers view the
street youth as a potential treat to their personal safety and their moral
values (Ballinger 2001b). For the consumers the potential threat lies in the
assumption that the youth are either homeless or working class youth that
belong to a social type that is different from the middle class consumer. The
consumers fear potential bodily harm or robbery. In addition to the real or
imaged threat of bodily harm and robbery, the mere presence of the youth
contradicts everything the consumer holds dear. The youth symbolize resistance
to the middle class values and beliefs of the middle class consumer. Among the
litany of folk devils, Cohen points out previous social types, such as:
"the Mod, the Rocker, the Greaser, the student militant, the drug fiend,
the vandal, the soccer hooligan, the hippy, the skinhead” 1990:11; original
1972). Cohen astutely argues that over time the social types that have created
fear and panic eventually "disappear from the public conscious, remaining
only in collective memory as folk devils of the past, to whom current horrors
can be compared" (1990: 10-11; original 1972). Eventually, the panic
concerning the loitering youth in Seattle will die and give rise to new social
types that will be deemed folk devils.
The second necessary sets of social actors to create and
perpetuate a moral panic according to Cohen are the "rule enforcers."
The rule enforcers are comprised of the agents of social control. These agents'
responsibilities are to "detect, apprehend and punish the folk
devils" (Muzzatti 2002:2). The police officers in Seattle who detain and
bring the folk devils to the station are "rule enforcers." In the
case of Seattle, the "rule enforcers" worked with local business
owners to devise a loitering control strategy of mounting stereo equipment on
the store fronts and blaring loud music that the intended targets would find
unpleasant and annoying.
One of the major influences on a moral panic is the media. The
manifest function of the media, when the topic is crime and deviance, is to
inform the lay populace as to deviant behavior and its consequences (Cohen
1990; original 1972). This invariably results in the reporting of sensational
crimes, such as serial murders (Cohen 1990; original 1972). The media coverage
results in its latent function, the distortion and perpetuation of moral panic
(Cohen 1990; original 1972). On August 28, 2001 National Public Radio
aired Rob Ballenger’s piece entitled, "Music Deters Crime
(Ballinger 2001b)." Ballinger's coverage of the loitering youth and the
reactions of local community members and business owners illustrated a classic
example of how the media can serve to perpetuate a panic. Balinger's piece
appeared in two forms, audio and print. His piece brought the reactions of the
business owners to street youth to a wider audience. The piece informed people
who lived outside the two communities, in both the city of Seattle and
nationally, who the deviants were, how they have become to be defined as
deviant and the consequences of their deviant behavior. Ballinger's piece
identified whom the deviants were; the working poor youth, homeless youth and
working class youth. The consequences of the deviants’ behavior resulted in the
creation of an unfavorable shopping environment for middle and upper-middle
class consumers (Ballinger 2001b). The unfavorable shopping environment
resulted in the economically privileged consumers shopping in other districts
(Ballinger 2001b). The customers who still to frequent the shopping districts
where the loitering youth continue to congregate still experience a feeling of
uneasiness and fear (Ballinger 2001b). Moreover, the customers admit that while
they still experience a fear of victimization, the music blaring from the
storefront gives them a positive ambiance (Ballinger 2001b).
The fourth set of actors involved in the creation of a moral panic
are politicians. Muzzatti (2002: 2) succinctly describes the role politicians play in the creation
and perpetuation of moral panics:
As individuals who live and die in the
court of public opinion, it is extremely important that politicians
present themselves as purveyors of the
moral high ground. As such, they often align themselves with
the press and the rule enforcers in a
struggle against the evils perpetuated by the folk devils.
The political leaders in Seattle have been waging a war against
youth, particularly homeless youth, since the mid 1990s (Schubert 1996). In
1996, due to public pressure from community members, action groups and law
enforcement agencies, the legislature in the state of Washington passed
"Becca bills." These bills require that anyone who is known to be a
runaway be turned in to the police. Those responsible for reporting runaways
include teachers, health care providers, employers and parents (Schubert 1996).
In conjunction with the Becca bills, facilities such as homeless shelters were
to be constructed to accommodate runways. From the late 1990s to present date
countless accounts by the media, community leaders, business owners and action
groups have reported on escalating youth homelessness and loitering. The Becca
bills is one example of how politicians have worked in conjunction with
community members, action groups and law enforcement agencies to eliminate the
problem of youth homelessness and loitering. The passage of the Becca bills has
amounted to nothing more than rhetoric to appease the public and action group
and alleviate the pressure they placed on politicians. Furthermore, the passage
of the bills also gave law enforcement more discretionary power to deal with
homeless and loitering youth.
One of the caveats of the Becca bills was the supposed
construction of more facilities to house homeless and loitering youth. However,
these facilities have not been constructed as previously anticipated, in fact
many of the homeless shelters already in existence prior to the passage of the
Becca bills have been shut down (Schubert 1996). Thus, instead of the runaways
being placing in a facility where they can receive aid and have a safe place to
stay, they are instead sent to jail (Schubert 1996). University Avenue was a
street that in years past had several of the city's runaway facilities. Many of
the shelters on “the Ave" have been shut down due lack of money (Ballinger
2001b). The end result of the closure of many of the "Ave's" homeless
shelters has been an influx of homeless and loitering youth in that area
(Ballinger 2001b).
The fifth sets of actors involved in moral panic is the general
public or lay populace. Many scholars who study moral panics argue that the
most crucial actor in a moral panic is the general public (Cohen 1990; original
1972; Ben-Yehuda, 1990; McCorkle and Miethe 2002; Muzzatti 2002; Springhall
1998). According to Muzzatti:
The success of the media, politicians,
rule enforcers and moral entrepreneurs in generating
and sustaining a moral panic is
ultimately contingent upon how successfully they enrage the
public and marshal their support against
the folk devils (2002:3).
In the case of Seattle, the public has supported the claims of the
media, politicians, law enforcement agencies and action groups concerning the
homeless youth and loitering youth. The public has supported the efforts of
community and state political leaders in the passage of the Becca bills to
solve the problem of homeless youth and loitering youth on the streets of
Seattle (Schubert 1996). In addition, the public has supported the efforts of
law enforcement agencies responding to calls placed by business owners
complaining about homeless youth and loitering youth preventing consumers from
entering their establishments. Moreover, the public has been active consumers
of media accounts of the status of homeless youth and loitering youth in
Seattle. The public has also supported the reactions of local action groups
such as an organization comprised of the remaining business located on the
"Ave."
The final set of actors that is an integral part of the creation
and perpetuation of a moral panic is action groups. These groups are often
times formed over an issue(s) defined by people as a condition that is
threatening, requires action and "something needs to be done about
it" (Cohen 1990; original 1972). In the case of Seattle, the action group
already existed prior to the panic over the folk devils. The action group that
took up battling the homeless youth and loitering youth is the University
Avenue Business Association. The business association was unsatisfied with
local law enforcement's handling of the homeless youth and loitering youth
which resulted in the Association’s development and implementation of an
innovative strategy. The Association’s innovative strategy was similar to that
of the owner of the McDonald’s across town. The Association’s strategy involved
stereo speakers and music, which was the same as the McDonald's owner. However,
the Association’s innovation differed from the McDonald's owner in so far as
the music selection; theirs was classical music selections instead of country.
The integral ingredient for a successful action group formation or
existing group is the moral belief that their cause is just. For Cohen, he
defined this as "legitimating values." The legitimating values for
the business association was that the presence of the homeless youth and
loitering youth created a hostile environment for their customers. They
believed that the mere presence of the folk devils evoked fear of victimization
in the hearts of their customers. More importantly, they believed that the folk
devils deterred their potential patrons from consuming the commodities sold
within their establishments. The support for the business association’s moral
belief that the folk devils were harming the sale of commodities within their
stores came from customer complaints (Ballinger 2001b). The remedy needed was
two-fold: 1) it had to deter the folk devils, and 2) it needed to evoke the
feeling of security in the hearts of their potential patrons through creation
of ambiance. The remedy devised by the business association involved mounting
stereo speakers on their storefronts and blaring classical music selections.
After the implementation of the installation of the stereo speakers the
business owners determined that their remedy was on one hand a success and on
the other a failure. They deemed that the classical music selections created an
ambiance that lured some customers back to their establishments. Despite the music's
ability to create a superficial feeling of security in the hearts of their
patrons, the folk devils remained on the streets of University Avenue.
Evaluation of
the Policy
The McDonald's owner and the Business Association of University Avenue
implemented the innovative loitering control strategies independently of one
another. As such, the strategy employed by both, the McDonald's owner and the
University Avenue Business Association should be evaluated separately by
locale. The owner of the McDonald's on 3rd and Pine told media
reporters that the installation of the sound system and country music format
has reduced the numbers in front of the establishment (Ballinger 2001b). Since
the actual figures for the number of service calls responded to at 3rd
and Pine by law enforcement agents before and after the implementation of the
loitering control strategy were unable to be obtained, it is impossible to empirically prove that
the strategy has been successful. One
could, however, evaluate the policy based on the business owner’s determination
of success or failure. The measure of the whether or not the policy met the
intended result or outcome is the definition of success by the proprietor. In
addition, it is important to evaluate the policy through the theoretical
frameworks discussed earlier.
The rational choice model put forth by Cornish and Clarke is based
on the notion that potential offenders engage in a cognitive process of
determining whether to begin, continue or cease a criminal or deviant behavior
(1986; 1987). The utility of the rational theory model is its usefulness in
guiding the development situational crime prevention strategies (Cornish and
Clarke, 1986). Scholars that conduct research in situational crime prevention
strategies would suggest the application of the rational choice model of
criminal and deviant behavior in identifying the causes of the youths loitering
and the creation of an unpleasant environment for the loitering youths via
blaring country music is an effective situational crime prevention strategy.
Scholars conducting research on moral panics view the actions and
reactions of the folk devils, rule enforcers, the media, politicians, the
public and the action group (the McDonald's business owner is defined as such)
in the creation of moral panic in Seattle. The homeless youth and loitering
youth were figuratively labeled folk devils by the moral entrepreneurs. The
rule enforcers and the action group worked collectively to develop and execute
a plan to eradicate the folk devils at 3rd and Pine (Ballinger
2001b). The media covered the situation and brought it to the attention of a
wider audience. The politicians passed legislation to further deal with the
folk devils. The public conspicuously consumed the rhetoric of the media, rule
enforcers and politicians condemning the folk devils.
Despite the theoretical saliency that supports the successfulness
of both, the situational crime prevention strategy and creation of a moral
panic, an alternative explanation still remains. It is arguable that the mass
transit system could explain what looks like the successfulness of the
situational crime prevention strategy and the creation of moral panic. Marcus
Felson in Crime and Everyday Life
writes about the mass transit-juvenile delinquency nexus. Felson argues that
the creation of mass transit allowed unsupervised youth the ability to move
about large metropolitan cities with relative ease (1998). We must remember
that in front of the McDonald's on 3rd and Pine is a bus shelter
that is in the middle of the mass transit system in Seattle. It is possible
that the loitering youth that came from working class familial backgrounds (not
the homeless youth) shortly before and during the installation grew tired of 3rd
and Pine and moved to another location on the transit line. Further examination
into whether or not other locations on the transit line experienced an influx
in loitering youth shortly before and during the implementation of the sound
system would yield either support or negate the evidence supporting the
situational crime prevention strategy.
The
"Ave"
On University Avenue, the business association had anticipated two
outcomes by the installation of stereo equipment at three locations on the
avenue: 1) it needed to evoke the feeling of security in the hearts of their
potential patrons through creation of ambiance and, 2) it needed deter the
loiters/folk devils (Ballinger 2001b). Since the number of homeless youths and
loiters/folk devils hanging out on the "Ave" before and after the
installation of the sound systems were never actually established, it is
difficult to empirically prove whether or not the policy is successful. When a
spokesperson for the business association was interviewed by a media reporter
regarding the sound systems, he noted that it was both a success and failure
(Ballinger 2001b). The sound system was successful in creating an enticing
ambience for consumers. However, it was
a failure in deterring the homeless youth and loiters/folk devils.
The situational crime prevention strategy employed by the business
association failed to meet its intended goal of deterring homeless youth and
loitering youths. Despite the strategy’s failure, supporters of the rational
choice model put forth by Cornish and Clarke and situational crime prevention
based on this model would argue that this does not discredit the theoretical
construct. Cornish and Clarke have argued this very point in their article
"Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice
Theory." For Cornish and Clarke the failure of a situational crime
prevention strategy does not negate the theory but rather signifies that the
wrong strategy was implemented (1996). Thus, supporters of this theoretical
affiliation would argue that a situational crime prevention strategy is
possible in deterring homeless youth and loitering youth, but is has failed to
be properly developed and executed.
The homeless youth and loitering youth were labeled folk devils by
the moral entrepreneurs in Seattle. The media coverage attributed the economic
decline of businesses on the "Ave" to the folk devils (Schubert 1996;
Ballinger 2001; Ballinger 2001b). The rule enforcers responded to the public’s
growing concern over the decline of the "Ave" by hauling folk devils
off to jail. The politicians responded to public pressure regarding the folk
devils and granted the rule enforcers greater discretionary power in removing
folk devils from the "Ave" with the passage of the Becca bills. The
action group (the "Ave's" business association) reacted negatively
towards the folk devils and attempted to deter them from congregating on the
sidewalks of the "Ave." While the folk devils, rule enforcers, the
media, politicians, the public and the action group were successful in the
creation of moral panic in Seattle, one set of actors in particular were met
with unanticipated consequences that resulted from their actions.
The action group involved with the creation and perpetuation of
moral panic yielded unforeseen results. The action group banded together,
championed the moral high ground, and waged war with folk devils on the
"Ave." The actions of the action group failed to rid the streets of
the folk devils (Ballinger 2001b). Moreover, the actions of the action group
elicited resistance in the hearts of the folk devils. A reporter who
interviewed folk devils on the "Ave" quoted several of their
responses in an article. One response in particular captures the folk devils
sentiments concerning their resistance to the business association’s efforts,
"It's 'cause they just think that just by playing that type of music that
it's going to scare people off, or encourage them to go somewhere else, which
it isn't gonna work (Ballinger 2001)." The folk devils' resistance is more
than failing to cease loitering on the "Ave." Some scholars would
argue that the folk devils' resistance is symbolic of something more
meaningful. They would argue that folk devils' are also resisting dominant
cultural values and ideology (Cohen 1990; original 1972; Hebdige 1989; original
1979). Thus, the folk devils' resistance is a statement that reflects their
opposition to middle class values and ideology.
The theoretical framework of the constitution of a moral panic has
empirical evidence that points out the policy's failure to "push" the
folk devils' to another area in the city. The framework explicitly describes
the youth culture-delinquency nexus on the "Ave". It only explains
the working class youth that are known to hang out on there. Less than a decade
ago the "Ave" had several facilities that accommodated homeless
youth. Today, many of the homeless shelters have closed do to lack of funding,
despite the promises made in conjunction with the Becca bills. An alternative
explanation may lie in the fact that the "Ave" has experienced a rise
in homeless due to shelter closures rather than youth resistance.
Conclusion
The practice of mounting stereo equipment to the exterior of
business establishments in hopes to deter working class and homeless street youth
demonstrates the lengths to which proprietors will go to when the loss of
economic profits are at stake. The proprietors at the locations, 3rd
and Pine and on University Avenue, felt that if the youths would just leave the
sidewalks in front of their businesses, they could entice their lost customers
to return and frequent their business establishments, bringing with them their
purchasing power.
The events at 3rd and Pine and University Avenue reveal
more than the reactions of business owners to the loss of profits. The events
illuminate the connection between criminological theory and applied
criminology. The use of two different criminological theories, rational choice
and moral panic presented two unique vantage-points in understanding the
phenomena of music as a mechanism for deterrence. The rational choice model
exposed the remnants of the classical school that are still present in
criminology today. The moral panic theoretical construct illuminated the impact
sociology has made in the field of criminology through the incorporation of
symbolic interactionism.
Examining the innovative, yet informal practice of using music to
deter juvenile delinquency through theoretical lens yielded an incomprehensive
explanation as to the success and/or failure of the informal deterrence
practice in Seattle. The rational choice model does not account for the
intervening role mass transit played, and possibly contributed to the
appearance of a successful policy evaluation. Similarly, the same holds true
for University Avenue. Perhaps the closures of several of the homeless shelters
located on and near University Avenue contributed to the continued presence of
homeless youth. However, the theoretical construct of moral panic adequately
explained the failure of the practice to deter working class youth from
congregating on the "Ave." Lastly, the latest method of deterrence,
music, as evidenced by the case in Seattle, signifies the American public’s
unwavering support and commitment to crime control strategies rooted in the
classical school of criminology.
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Darla Hernandez
is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology at Southern Illinois
University Edwardsville. Her email
is dhernan@siue.edu